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Deracialization and Democracy
Steven A. Ramirez † & Neil G. Williams††
Abstract
The United States suffers the continued costs of maintaining a
racial hierarchy. Enhanced diversity and growing realization of the
economic costs of that hierarchy could lead to democratic pressure for
reform. Yet, in the U.S., elites on the radical right seek to entrench
themselves in power through the constriction of voting power and the
strategic use of the racial hierarchy as a political tool. This Article
traces the anti-democratic efforts of the radical right to limit the
political power of the nation’s enhanced diversity, and to utilize archaic
governance measures to entrench themselves politically, regardless of
the costs of allowing the racial hierarchy to continue to fester. Antidemocratic efforts to limit voting power to assure non-democratic
governance and outcomes recently scored significant success as
recounted in this Article. The anti-democratic contrivances to limit the
power of enhanced diversity requires comparable countermeasures to
vindicate the core value of expanded democracy that find its roots in
our history and in the Constitution’s trajectory towards ever greater
democratic governance. This Article surveys countermeasures that
could lead to the preservation and even expansion of democratic
governance. It concludes that only through a renewed pursuit of
expansive voting rights can we restore our democracy and move the
nation away from its racist past.
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Introduction
Some notable scholars maintain that the United States’ racial
hierarchy will endure permanently. 1 Others maintain that appropriate
legal frameworks can diminish the influence of racial hierarchies, at least
to the extent that human capital is broadly developed 2 and the rule of
law 3 operates free of racial discrimination. 4 Attitudes may operate
beyond the law, at least over the short and medium term, but law can
operate free of discrimination, and if all human capital develops to its
maximum potential, then perhaps law sets the stage for continual
1.

E.g., Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well 92 (1992);
see also id. at ix (“[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible
component of this society.”); Derrick Bell, Law as a Religion, 69 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 265, 265 (2018) (“[W]e know from history and experience
that law will never deliver justice and that law in America will never
deliver racial justice; yet, we are called upon to believe somehow justice
is just around the corner.”).

2.

World Bank Group, The Human Capital Project 32 (2018)
(scoring the U.S.’s next generation of workers at 76% of potential in terms
of human capital development and Singapore’s at 88%, notwithstanding
high ethnic diversity), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/30498/33252.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y [https:
//perma.cc/2SAK-3EHJ].

3.

The U.S. rates poorly today on the rule of law insofar as racial
discrimination is concerned. See World Justice Project, Rule of
Law Index 2017–2018, at 153 (2018) (ranking the U.S. a modest 19 out
of 113 nations in adherence to the rule of law and scoring the U.S.
especially weak on absence of discrimination in its criminal and civil
justice systems), available at https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/
files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2018-June-Online-Edition_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G2E5-PCSN]. Other nations beset by a history of racial divisions,
such as Singapore, score much higher than the U.S. on absence of discrim–
ination under law. Id. at 134.

4.

Continued racial (or irrational) discrimination against a substantial part
of any given population will result in a compromised rule of law, as well
as impaired human development, which will negatively impact society as
a whole through constricted macroeconomic performance and stunted
human development. See Steven A. Ramirez & Neil G. Williams, On the
Permanence of Racial Injustice and the Possibility of Deracialization, 69
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 299, 322–24 (2018). The internationally renowned
consultancy firm of McKinsey & Company found that U.S. GDP in 2008
was $525 billion lower than it would be if there were no education gap
between whites and minorities. Byron G. Auguste et al., The Economic
Cost of the US Education Gap, McKinsey & Company: Social Sector
(June 2009), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-insights/
the-economic-cost-of-the-us-education-gap [https://perma.cc/J967-RBSC].
See also Steven A. Ramirez, What We Teach About When We Teach
About Race: The Problem of Law and Pseudo-Economics, 54 J. Leg.
Educ. 365, 375 (2004) (estimating that the macroeconomic costs of race
to approach $1 trillion per year).
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progress in terms of eliminating racial privileges and hierarchies. 5 This
more sanguine view of the possibility of deracialization, however,
assumes that demographic and economic pressures find expression
through a rationalized system of democratic decision-making that
reflects the needs and desires of the entire population. 6 But in the U.S.
today, democracy and majority rule prove elusive. 7
In terms of economics, the U.S. faces an enormous challenge that
promises to steadily worsen: the corrosive influence of a socially
constructed racial hierarchy that leaves millions of young Americans
stranded at the margins of our economy and deprives our economy of
a rationalized human-capital-formation function. 8 Our legal and educa–
tional system propagates and entrenches this irrational economic
reality, and the legal academy plays a central role in this deeply

5.

Ramirez & Williams, supra note 4, at 338 (“[T]he staggering economic
costs of the Court’s reactionary position on our racial hierarchy, combined
with demographic realities, suggest the Court’s approach is both economically
and politically unsustainable.”); see also id. at 307–24 (detailing the operation
and the costs of the U.S.’s racial hierarchy).

6.

Most Americans rate our democracy “weak,” and over two-thirds find it
“weakening.” George W. Bush Institute et al., The Democracy
Project 4-5 (2018) [hereinafter Democracy Project], available at
https://www.democracyprojectreport.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/FINAL
_POLL_REPORT_Democracy_Project_2018_v5.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ST4V-NSP9]. The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks democratic
governance across the world in terms of the degree to which the will of
the people governs and it finds that the U.S. system rates as a “flawed
democracy” that has substantially declined since 2006. The Economist
Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political
Participation, Protest and Democracy 10, 41 (2018) [hereinafter EIU
Democracy Index].

7.

American Democracy’s Built-in Bias towards Rural Republicans,
Economist, (July 12, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/
12/american-democracys-built-in-bias-towards-rural-republicans [https://
perma.cc/VE4R-XG9E] (“America . . . is plagued by the only democratic
vice more troubling than the tyranny of the majority: tyranny of the
minority.”); Timothy Egan, Our Fake Democracy, N.Y. Times (June 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/opinion/our-fake-democracy
.html [https://perma.cc/6ESE-T8L3] (“For the United States, the biggest
institutional lie of the moment is that we have a government of the people,
responding to majority will.”).

8.

Human ingenuity drives all innovation, which in turn drives sustainable
macroeconomic growth. See Steven A. Ramirez, Lawless Capitalism
137 (2013). As such, the nation that maximizes the capacity of its human
resources will invariably out-innovate and out-grow nations that allow
human resources to wallow in economically oppressive conditions. See id.
at 20. In the U.S. today, about 40% of African-American children and
35% of Latino children suffer from poverty-driven opportunity losses. See
id. at 135.
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suboptimal economic outcome 9 by failing to teach both the role of the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on using the Equal Protection Clause to
protect only those at the top of economic and social hierarchies and the
importance of the core value of democracy. 10 Our entire society bears
the cost of this economic challenge in the form of trillions of dollars in
foregone macroeconomic growth. 11 In addition, our entire society suffers
9.

For example, recent criminal allegations of fraud in connection with
college admissions, whereby wealthy whites bought their way into high
status universities, spotlighted again all the legal ways the Supreme Court
allows affirmative action programs that largely benefit wealthy whites.
See Clare Lombardo, How Admissions Really Work: If The College
Admissions Scandal Shocked You, Read This, NPR, (Mar. 23, 2019, 9:15
AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/23/705183942/how-admissions-reallywork-if-the-college-admissions-scandal-shocked-you-read-th [https://perma.
cc/B8WM-ZPES] (“There are lots of ways that wealthy families get a
boost in the college admissions process. Most are quite legal.”); How to
De-Corrupt College Admissions, Christian Sci. Monitor, (Mar. 19,
2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2019/
0313/How-to-de-corrupt-college-admissions [https://perma.cc/8GRN-2PG9]
(“[T]he FBI announced 50 indictments related to fraud and bribery in the
admissions process of several elite universities. More indictments are
expected.”); Poison Ivy, Economist, (Sept. 21, 2006), https://www.
economist.com/united-states/2006/09/21/poison-ivy [https://perma.cc/
RBK3-87H3] (“No less than 60% of the places in elite universities are
given to candidates who have some sort of extra ‘hook’, from rich or
alumni parents to ‘sporting prowess.’ The number of whites who benefit
from this affirmative action is far greater than the number of blacks.”).

10.

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court 293–
94 (2014) (concluding that, institutionally, the Court operates to protect
the interests of dominant political and economic elites, rather than
protecting minorities, individual rights, or long-term values); see also
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (expanding
the power of corporations’ electioneering abilities and thereby empowering
the CEOs of such corporations); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Yet, of the cases in this Court
in which the Fourteenth Amendment was applied during the first fifty
years after its adoption, less than one-half of one per cent. invoked it in
protection of [African Americans], and more than fifty per cent. asked
that its benefits be extended to corporations.”). One commentator calls
the Supreme Court “one of the most powerful and most malign
institutions in American history.” Ian Millhiser, Injustices, at x
(2016). The injustices perpetrated by the Court that Millhiser highlights
include the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the powerful
instead of the most vulnerable, empowering billionaires to “corrupt
American democracy,” and neutering voting-rights protections for minorities.
Id. at xii–xiii. Essentially, Millhiser argues that the Supreme Court
embraces “extra-constitutional limits on the government’s ability to
protect the most vulnerable Americans, while simultaneously refusing to
enforce rights that are explicitly enshrined in the Constitution’s text.” Id.
at xiii.

11.

Impaired macroeconomic growth means we all sell goods and services into
a smaller market with less demand. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 28–29. The
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the effects of stunted human-capital development and innovation. 12 Law
frames and promotes this outcome on a systemic basis, with the
Supreme Court non-democratically paving the way towards macro–
economic backwardness. 13
In terms of demographics, we believe that new demographic and
economic realities will create opportunities for the kinds of initiatives
needed to diminish the perpetuation of our racial hierarchy—
specifically, the broadest possible embrace of cultural diversity under
the law and the broadest human development. Demographically, people
of color will constitute a majority of the U.S. population by 2045.14
“New census population projections confirm the importance of racial
minorities as the primary demographic engine of the nation’s future
growth, countering an aging, slow-growing and soon to be declining
white population.” 15 Specifically, in 2045 the nation is projected to be
49.7% white, 24.6% Hispanic, 13.1% African American, 7.9% Asian
American, and 3.8% multiracial populations. 16 This will create impor–
tant economic and social changes across society.
United Nations publishes the Inequality-adjusted Human Development
Index (“IHDI”) that tests the degree to which law and institutions serve
a given society in terms of life expectancy, education, and standard of
living. United Nations Development Programme, Human Devel–
opment Indicators and Indices: 2018 Statistical Update 1–13 (2018),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-indicesindicators-2018-statistical-update [https://perma.cc/XD9Z-CZWK]. The
U.S. ranks modestly on this measure of well-being at thirteenth, id. at 22;
Singapore ranks ninth while maintaining a much higher per-capita income
(more than 50%) advantage over the U.S. Id. at 30.
12.

Impaired human-capital formation leads to lower innovation, lower
consumption, and, thus, less growth. See Ramirez, supra note 8, at 22–
23.

13.

Steven A. Ramirez, Foreword: Diversity in the Legal Academy After
Fisher II, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 979, 985 & n.36 (2018) (citing George
Mace, The Antidemocratic Nature of Judicial Review, 60 Calif. L. Rev.
1140, 1149 (1972) (“Since to resist a majority the judiciary must be
independent of that majority, the character of judicial review is properly
antidemocratic.”)).

14.

William H. Frey, The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census
Projects, Brookings: The Avenue (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in2045-census-projects/ [https://perma.cc/2L62-S2ZG].

15.

Id.

16.

Id. Current projections illustrate a contrast between the youth minority
population and the aging white population:
Minorities will be the source of all of the growth in the nation’s
youth and working age population, most of the growth in its
voters, and much of the growth in its consumers and tax base as
far into the future as we can see. Hence, the more rapidly growing,

85

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
Deracialization and Democracy

While this will create political pressure for racial reform, America’s
representative democracy faces severe distortions as a result of the
arcane and archaic legal frameworks associated with the preservation
of slavery and the enduring reality of racism in America. 17 Thus, for
example, with respect to the Electoral College, Professor Juan Perea
reviewed the pro-slavery structure of the Constitution 18 and quotes
James Madison for the proposition that the founders needed to address
the problem of maintaining slavery in light of superior popular voting
power in the North. 19 The solution was the Electoral College, which,
along with the infamous “three-fifths of all other persons” rule, ensured
that the South could maintain slavery for decades. 20 Most recently, this
meant that Hillary Clinton lost the 2016 election despite the fact that
she garnered over three million votes more than Donald Trump in the
final certified election results. 21 The U.S. Senate operates as a racial
largely white senior population will be increasingly dependent on
their contributions to the economy and to government programs
such as Medicare and Social Security. This suggests the necessity
for continued investments in the nation’s diverse youth and young
adults as the population continues to age.
Id.
17.

This Article envisions a democratic republic cabined within traditional
constitutional limitations, but free of the distortions of our racial history
and faithful to the Amendments expanding voting rights. See, e.g.,
Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 531, 565 (1998) (“Indications from the time surrounding
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution suggest that . . . the view
of accountability that the founding community held . . . is a view of
accountability as a notion of blame.”); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of
Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1503, 1521 (1990) (“If the Constitution’s
Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a bizarre manner
of demonstrating their affection.”). Consequently, this Article seeks
constrained democracy with limited majority rule and universal suffrage.

18.

E.g., Juan F. Perea, Echoes of Slavery II: How Slavery’s Legacy Distorts
Democracy, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1081, 1083 (2018) [hereinafter Perea,
Echoes] (“One of the proslavery features of the Constitution is the electoral
college, enacted as a way to protect the interests of slave owners.”); see also
Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the
Proslavery Constitution, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1123, 1148 (2012) [hereinafter
Perea, Proslavery] (“If we ignore the evidence of a proslavery Constitution,
we are not likely to inquire into the important present ramifications of
the proslavery Constitution.”).

19.

Perea, Echoes, supra note 18, at 1088 (illustrating that Madison was
aware that the “right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern
than the Southern States”).

20.

See id. at 1083–88.

21.

See Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote,
CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/
donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html [https://
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gerrymander that today preserves white, male power. 22 Certainly, the
law channels and defines the impact of political pressure. 23 This Article
will show that the law today defines the U.S. political system in a
fundamentally non-democratic, pro-oligarchy way that too often nega–
tes and neutralizes pressure for racial justice. 24
The Founding Fathers originally intended to impose an oligarchy
upon our nation with very limited democratic influence. 25 Aside from
perma.cc/HM93-W3PA].
22.

See Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority
Vote Dilution and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction, 25
Hastings Const. L.Q. 277, 354 (1998). The constitutional debates
regarding the Senate were intimately bound to the issue of slavery. See
Jill Lepore, These Truths: A History of the United States 122–
25 (2018).

23.

Keith E. Whittington et al., The Study of Law and Politics, in The
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 3 (Keith E. Whittington et
al. eds., 2008) (“[L]aw is not only the product of politics but also constitutive
of politics.”).

24.

The threat of oligarchic rule and its costs first emerged with respect to
the Great Financial Crisis of 2008:
The Great Recession has awakened us to something new in the
nation’s social and economic development. Inequality has been
rising for decades, but recent shocks have laid bare what this
means for our social structure: a shrinking middle class and an
increasingly entrenched wealthy elite. Americans remain profo–
undly attached to an idea of America as a middle-class nation,
with very few of us on the economic margins, abundant oppor–
tunities to raise oneself or one’s offspring into the middle classes,
and everyone enjoying a fair shot at wealth and success. In fact
we are becoming the opposite. The number of Americans facing
real poverty is growing; opportunities for middle-class livelihoods
are shrinking; and economic clout is becoming concentrated at the
top to a degree that recalls the last Gilded Age. As structures of
opportunity have grown increasingly narrow and brittle, and class
differences have widened, the nation is becoming what reformers
throughout the nineteenth and early-twentieth century meant
when they talked about a society with a “moneyed aristocracy”
or a “ruling class”—an oligarchy, not a republic.
Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution,
94 B.U. L. Rev. 669, 672 (2014) (citation omitted).

25.

“By 1787 and the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, there were still no
federal laws regarding who could vote. The decision fell to states with
many maintaining the standard that favored white men of property,
wealth, and education. By George Washington’s election in 1789, only 6
percent of the population was permitted to vote.” Tom Huskerson, A Brief
History of Voter Registration in the United States, IVN: Archives (Dec,
13 2013), https://ivn.us/2013/12/13/independent-voter-network-ivn/
[https://perma.cc/4RKE-DMQR]. Of course, under the original Constitution
only the House of Representatives faced direct elections at all; the
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the distortions implicit in the U.S. Senate, the Electoral College, and
the inflation of Southern voting power through the three-fifths rule, the
Founders operated in full view of state laws that extended franchise
rights primarily to white, Protestant, male land owners—or about six
percent of the population. 26 The original intent of the Founders sought,
at best, to impose a highly constrained democratic republic with extr–
emely limited suffrage, and, at worst, to constitute a government with
only a bare semblance of democracy. 27 Americans hold democracy as a
core value, but the legally constructed political system in place today
is archaic and yields a perverse form of minority, not majority, rule. 28
Electoral College selected the President, and state legislatures selected
Senators. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3; id. art. II, § 1. Arguably, the original
Constitution enshrined a “slavocracy” alongside an oligarchy. See
Lepore, supra note 22, at 125 (“The most remarkable consequence of this
remarkable arrangement was to grant slave states far greater
representation in Congress than free states.”). Certain delegates bolted
the convention or spoke passionately against this outcome while others
noted with shame the intent of the Constitution’s basic structure. See id.
at 126–127 (noting that Martin Luther, Gouverneur Morris and John
Dickinson all voiced their opposition to slavery’s preservation in the
Constitution).
26.

Grace Panetta & Olivia Reaney, The Evolution of American Voting Rights
in 242 Years Shows How Far We’ve Come—and How Far We Still Have to
Go, Bus. Insider (Feb. 15, 2019, 9:25 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/when-women-got-the-right-to-vote-american-voting-rights-timeline2018-10 [https://perma.cc/HUD2-D7QY]. Many delegates thought the
states granted an “excess of democracy.” Lepore, supra note 22, at 121.

27.

At the beginning of the Republic, voting generally did not even include
the right to a secret ballot, which invited intimidation and even violence.
Jill Lepore, Rock, Paper, Scissors: How We Used to Vote, New Yorker
(Oct. 6, 2008), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/10/13/rockpaper-scissors [https://perma.cc/5BAF-J3HF].

28.

Joseph E. Stiglitz, Can American Democracy Come Back?, Boston Globe
(Nov. 7, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/11/
06/can-american-democracy-come-back/vzXt3DUbCeuWitpirTWCOJ/story.
html [https://perma.cc/9WB6-C7JH] (“The minority is dominating the
majority . . . . A majority of Americans want gun control, an increase in
the minimum wage, guaranteed access to health insurance, and better
regulation of the banks that brought on the 2008 crisis. Yet all of these
goals seem unattainable.”). Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, also
places democracy, race, and economics in a context similar to this Article:
[T]he Republican Party’s reliance on voter suppression, gerry–
mandering, and similar efforts at electoral manipulation have also
contributed to ensuring that the will of the majority is thwarted.
The party’s approach is perhaps understandable: After all, shift–
ing demographics have put the Republicans at an electoral disad–
vantage. A majority of Americans will soon be nonwhite, and a
21st-century world and economy cannot be reconciled with a
male-dominated society. And the urban areas where the majority
of Americans live, whether in the North or the South, have learned
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This Article addresses the question of whether democracy in the
U.S. will express the rising demographic and economic pressure for
change or whether law can distort democratic processes and neutralize
the rising political pressure for dismantling America’s festering racial
hierarchy. 29 Part II traces recent race-based attacks on U.S. democracy
designed to shift power to small bands of entrenched elites. Part II
strives to assess the viability of such attacks to foil future economic and
demographic pressure for reform. Part III highlights the Supreme
Court’s role in the effort to restore the eighteenth-century oligarchy the
Founders envisioned. Part IV summarizes historic and political devel–
opments that suggest that in the U.S., democracy remains a powerful
core value that will ultimately triumph over attacks on democracy from
the far right. Part V assesses the lawfulness of putative legal changes
that aim to save our representative democracy and end minority rule.
The search for solutions for the vindication of this core democratic
value, notwithstanding the archaic law framing democracy in America
and the far-right’s race-based attacks on democracy, teaches that the
U.S. should use all means necessary under the law to restore democracy
so it can restore the rule of law.
This Article concludes that law can secure an enhanced democracy
and thwart efforts to return America to an oligarchy. Instead, law will
shed the archaic and race-based remnants in the Constitution that
the value of diversity. Voters in these areas of growth and dynamism
have also seen the role that government can and must play to
bring about shared prosperity. They have abandoned the
shibboleths of the past, sometimes almost overnight. In a democratic
society, therefore, the only way a minority—whether it’s large
corporations trying to exploit workers and consumers, banks
trying to exploit borrowers, or those mired in the past trying to
recreate a bygone world—can retain their economic and political
dominance is by undermining democracy itself.
Id.
29.

Closely related to the racial hierarchy plaguing the U.S. is the emergence
of white-identity politics, in which white voters vote in ways both closely
aligned to notions of white interests and hostile to the perceived interests
of minorities:
One of the primary lessons of our current moment is that race
continues to inform our political and social relations in complex
and often poignant ways. In the current state of election law
doctrines, that complexity is lost. A presumption of good faith is
afforded to political actors, even when unjustified based on past
and present behavior. Politics and race relations are segregated in
judicial doctrines, despite their increased coalescence. These racial
blind spots are an accomplice to the perpetuation of white identity
politics.
Joshua S. Sellers, Election Law and White Identity Politics, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 1515, 1562, 1576 (2019).
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govern democracy in the U.S. today. These remnants of white supre–
macy negate and impair much of the voting rights expansion that marks
our constitutional history since the end of the Civil War. The ongoing
attack on American democracy strikes us as fundamentally countercultural and thus politically unsustainable. Eventually law will recon–
dition our democracy and politics, rendering racial reform inevitable.
To be clear, we do not contest the notion that a limited democracy is
necessary to avert a tyranny of the majority. Rather, we contest the
tyranny-of-minority rule that seeks to entrench privilege and raw
economic and political power beyond the reach of democratic gover–
nance. As we will show in the next part of this Article, race, democracy,
and the emergent U.S. oligarchy tightly intertwine.

I.

Race and the Attack on U.S. Democracy

Professor Nancy MacLean recently documented what she terms the
“radical right’s” efforts to diminish democratic power and influence in
our government, paving the way for the restoration of an oligarchy to
legally protect the interests of the very wealthy. 30 A small number of
billionaires and millionaires lead this effort, and they enjoy powerful
“intellectual” support from the many scholars they patronize. 31 Race
plays a central role in this effort even if the propagators of an oligarchy
today hold little interest in restoring the racial oppression of yester–
year. 32 Today, they intend to emasculate the federal government’s
ability to fund social spending and investment so that taxes and
spending remain permanently low regardless of the impact on economic
growth or the public’s desire. 33 Incidentally, they would denude the
30.

Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains, at xxxi (2017) (“Pushed by
relatively small numbers of radical-right billionaires and millionaires who
have become profoundly hostile to America’s modern system of govern–
ment, an apparatus decades in the making, funded by those same billionaires
and millionaires, has been working to undermine the normal governance
of our democracy.”).

31.

See id. at xxxii.

32.

See id. at 233–34.

33.

Professor MacLean summarizes the dream of the radical right:
the uncontested sway of the wealthiest citizens; the use of right
to work laws and other ploys to keep working people powerless;
the ability to fire dissenting public employees at will, targeting
educators in particular; the use of voting-rights restrictions to
keep those unlikely to agree with the elite from the polls; the
deployment of states’ rights to deter the federal government from
promoting equal treatment; the hostility to public education; the
regressive tax system; the opposition to Social Security and
Medicare; and the parsimonious response to public needs of all
kinds.
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federal government’s ability to ever breakdown our festering racial hier–
archy. 34
MacLean situates the intellectual roots of this anti-democratic
movement in John C. Calhoun’s efforts to maintain a slave-holding
oligarchy in the U.S. 35 Calhoun epitomized the white supremacy under–
lying slavery’s perpetuation at the nation’s founding. 36 “Not surprise–
ingly, then, but with devastating consequences all around, attacks on
federal power pitched to nonelites have almost always tapped white
racial anxiety, whether overtly or with coded language.” 37 The use of
Id. at 233.
34.

For example, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012), the Court seemingly recast the Commerce Clause in
a narrow fashion that could threaten innumerable federal programs and
actions. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 229–30. The radical right’s view
of the Constitution would validate strict limits on the government’s
ability to regulate business in accord with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). See MacLean, supra note 30, at 227–28. The radical right also
prefers that the Equal Protection Clause operate to protect the “already
privileged rather than the embattled citizens whose rights the [Fourteenth
Amendment] was designed to protect.” Id. at 228. Congress promulgated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, under the Commerce Clause.
E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964) (upholding,
unanimously, Title II of the Act under the Commerce Clause).

35.

MacLean, supra note 30, at 2–3.

36.

James W. Loewen, 10 Questions for Yale’s President, Chron. Higher
Educ. (May 25, 2016) https://www.chronicle.com/article/10-Questionsfor-Yale-s/236593 [https://perma.cc/T2R3-Z387]. Yale University
ultimately renamed its Calhoun College after finding that Calhoun’s
legacy principally revolved around racism and bigotry. See Office of the
President, Decision on the Name of Calhoun College, Yale U. (Feb. 11,
2017), https://president.yale.edu/decision-name-calhoun-college [https://
perma.cc/V8AK-BMQF]; Letter from The Presidential Advisory Group
on Renaming Calhoun College to Peter Salovey, President, Yale U. (Jan.
13, 2017), available at https://president.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/
Presidential%20Advisory%20Group%20-%20Calhoun%2001_13_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V34C-Y94R]. At the time of the renaming decision,
Yale President Peter Salovey stated: “John C. Calhoun’s legacy as a white
supremacist and a national leader who passionately promoted slavery as
a ‘positive good’ fundamentally conflicts with Yale’s mission and values.”
Yale Changes Calhoun College’s Name to Honor Grace Murray Hopper,
YaleNews (Feb. 11, 2017), https://news.yale.edu/2017/02/11/yale-changecalhoun-college-s-name-honor-grace-murray-hopper-0 [https://perma.cc/
9HAX-W5GE].

37.

MacLean, supra note 30, at 11. Calhoun openly acknowledged that the
South used race to obscure class divisions:
With us the two great divisions of society are not the rich and
poor, but white and black; and all the former, the poor as well as
the rich, belong to the upper class, and are respected and treated
as equals, if honest and industrious; and hence have a position
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race instrumentally worked in America as a means of dividing the lower
classes, disenfranchising black as well as white voters, and supporting
policies to protect wealth more than social well-being. 38 Along the way,
the Southern oligarchs used their influence to “ennoble” Southern
racism and strategically demean African Americans. 39 Economic back–
wardness followed in the wake of these efforts to destroy human
capabilities under the guise of race. 40
Today’s oligarchs operate in much the same way, even if they target
the nation as a whole rather than just the South as in decades past.
They spend billions of dollars to socially construct knowledge 41 in favor
of their political agenda and to influence academic areas ranging from
economics 42 to law. 43 “Now, as then, the leaders seek Calhoun-style
and pride of character of which neither poverty nor misfortune
can deprive them.
John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Oregon Bill (June 27, 1848), in The U.S.
Constitution: A Reader 419, 420 (Hillsdale C. Pol. Faculty eds., 2012),
available at http://cdn.constitutionreader.com/files/pdf/constitution/ch76.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7N4-ZK3K].
38.

MacLean, supra note 30, at 23.

39.

Id. at 33.

40.

For example, in response to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), Virginia closed its schools. MacLean, supra note 30, at 23.
Professor MacLean highlights that this decision hardly followed any
democratic voice; instead, a tight oligarchy controlled Virginia, such that
the rural state senators voting for school shutdowns represented fewer
Virginians than those urban-area senators who favored complying with
Brown. MacLean, supra note 30, at 23. It was only with the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that the control of this oligarchy broke and
a “cornucopia of economic growth” followed, particularly in Northern
Virginia. Id. at 92–93.

41.

Ultimately elites will distort knowledge to instrumentally serve their goals.
See MacLean, supra note 30, at 33.”

42.

In economics, economist James Buchanan worked closely with large
corporations and other mega-donors to form quasi-academic institutions
for the purpose of funding scholars with pro-free market and anti-spending
inclinations to influence policy-makers and inculcate students in freemarket dogma. MacLean, supra note 30, at 119–22. Some of these
institutions operated with only the thinnest veil of academic legitimacy.
Id. at 198. Indeed, even Buchanan himself protested (to no avail) the fact
that his namesake James Buchanan Center had no academic standing at
all. Id. at 203.

43.

In law, the political efforts to impose laissez-faire policies hit their zenith
in the law and economics movement. See George L. Priest, Michael
Trebilcock and the Past and Future of Law and Economics, 60 U.
Toronto L.J. 155, 156 (2010) (describing the origins of law and
economics as a “pro-market, anti-government political philosophy”). Key
leaders in this movement included Henry Manne at George Mason
University, who benefitted mightily from corporate patronage and radical-
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liberty for the few—the liberty to concentrate vast wealth, so as to dent
elementary fairness and freedom to the many.” 44 Further, because they
know that Americans generally do not favor the re-imposition of an
oligarchy, they deploy stealth and subterfuge (including the strategic
use of racial divisions) to subvert our democracy. 45 Race is particularly
potent in suppressing the vote—both white and minority. 46 MacLean
shares much in common with other scholars who study both the radical
right and the role of race in fueling its descent to minority rule. 47
For example, Professor Ian Haney-López demonstrates the use of
“dog-whistle politics” to entrench the interests of political and economic
elites, and the use of race in America to disempower both working-class
whites and communities of color. 48 He argues in his book, Dog Whistle
Politics, that “politicians backed by concentrated wealth manipulate
racial appeals to win elections and also to win support for regressive
policies that help corporations and the super-rich, and in the process
wrecking the middle class.” 49 Among the many startling realities he
highlights: no Democratic candidate for the White House won a
right billionaires such as Charles Koch. MacLean, supra note 30, at 122,
126. Manne awarded economist James Buchanan a law-and-economics
award even as Buchanan openly pursued the goal of imposing an antidemocratic oligarchy in the name of his crusade for “economic liberty.”
Id. at 152. Another law-and-economics luminary urged restricting voting
rights to “property owners, educated classes, [and] employed persons.” Id.
(quoting George Stigler, Why Have the Socialists Been Winning?,
Presidential Address to the Mont Pelerin Society (1978)). Ultimately,
Manne operated a “law and economics” institute to inculcate more than
forty percent of the federal judiciary in the so-called benefits of laissezfaire economics. Id. at 195.
44.

MacLean, supra note 30, at 234.

45.

Id. at 151–53, 234.

46.

Id. at 231.

47.

See Jane Mayer, Dark Money 3–46, 167–76, 182–85 (2016) (highlighting
the use of a “fully integrated network” of academic programs, think tanks,
and advocacy groups bent on imposing libertarian policies and funded by
a tight network of billionaires uninterested in racist policies but willing to
use race to buttress their cause); Ramirez, supra note 8, at 152–56 (tying
racial politics and the Southern Strategy to the financial deregulation and
exploitation that drove the Great Financial Crisis); Sellers, supra note 29,
at 1525, 1529, 1531–32 (“[W]hite identity politics is a pervasive political
feature, habitually exploited by the Republican Party.”).

48.

Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics, at ix (2014) (“In the last 50
years, dog whistle politics has driven broad swaths of white voters to
adopt a self-defeating hostility to government, and in the process has
remade the very nature of race and racism. American politics today—and
the crisis of the middle class—cannot be understood without recognizing
racism’s evolution and the power of pernicious demagoguery.”).

49.

Id. at xii.
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majority of white votes since the election of 1964, or stated differently,
since the effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 50 Even in the
election of 1964, five southern states swung to the GOP and since then
have formed the reliable base upon which the GOP thrives. 51 Richard
Nixon successfully ascended to the presidency in 1968 thanks in part to
the “Southern Strategy” he deployed to attract disenchanted workingclass whites across the nation who fundamentally opposed racial
integration and equality. 52 Today, white voters constitute about ninety
percent of the GOP’s base; and whites constitute ninety-eight percent
of elected GOP officials. 53 As such, Professor Haney López concludes
that these phenomena have “transmogrif[ied] the GOP into the ‘white
man’s party.’” 54
To be fair, both parties have at varying times, and to varying
degrees, engaged in similar “race-baiting.” 55 Yet, the history of race in
America and the current social realities favor the radical right because
of racial stereotypes regarding such things as crime and welfare. 56 Thus,
Haney López shows that empirically racial-coding works on issues of
crime and welfare spending, but only to the extent that such coding
50.

See id. at 211, app. at 233.

51.

Michael Oreskes, Civil Rights Act Leaves Deep Mark On the American
Political Landscape, N.Y. Times (July 2, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/
1989/07/02/us/civil-rights-act-leaves-deep-mark-on-the-american-politicallandscape.html [https://perma.cc/XS8V-5VXJ]. See also Haney López,
supra note 48, at 212 (recounting Lyndon Johnson’s lament that “I think
we just delivered the South to the Republican party for a long time to
come”).

52.

Haney López, supra note 48, at 25–27. Two GOP chairmen, Michael
Steele and Ken Mehlman, admitted that the party used the so-called
Southern Strategy’s racial hostility and coded language to attract
working-class voters. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 152. President Nixon, as
well as at least two of his senior aides, also essentially admitted to using
racial anxiety and racial divisions as a political tool. Haney López, supra
note 48, at 24–27.

53.

Haney López, supra note 48, at 212. Professor Haney López notes that
these percentages date from before the so-called Tea Party backlash to
the Obama presidency. Id. at 147–59.

54.

Id. at 212.

55.

Bill Clinton, My Life 395 (2005) (admitting that he proposed a “new
Democratic Party” in response to the claims of so-called Reagan Democrats
that the government was taking their money and giving it to blacks); see
also Haney López, supra note 48, at 22–34 (describing Richard Nixon’s
use of race-baiting in the 1968 election and the strategies employed by
Democrats and Republicans in the South).

56.

Thus, for example, Nixon famously emphasized “law and order.” Haney
López, supra note 48, at 23–24. Ronald Reagan’s campaign rhetoric
included terminology that culled up race, such as “welfare queen” or
“strapping young bucks” buying steaks with food stamps. Id. at 4.
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does not vault the issue into the forefront of voters’ minds. 57 In
experiments testing the effectiveness of “dog whistles” that appeal to
subconscious racial stereotypes, researchers found that “whites temper
their response to dog whistle pandering once they understand a political
appeal as racial.” 58 Haney López traces the evolution of dog-whistle
politics through to the present, concluding that despite protestations
that it was a fundamentally non-racist movement, “the Tea Party was
almost wholly a creature of rightwing dog whistle politics.” 59
After the election of 2016, Ian Haney López and Robert Reich
applied the lessons of Dog Whistle Politics to Donald Trump:
Trump’s election reflects the triumph of dog-whistle politics—the
use of (barely) coded racial appeals to mobilize white voters who
have become anxious about their social position and economic
standing. Nothing better illustrates this strategy’s potency than
the demographics of Trump’s support. Exit polls show nonHispanic whites contributed 86 percent of Trump’s votes, while a
further 3.4 percent came from Hispanic whites. African Americans
constituted only 2 percent of Trump’s votes. 60

Trump’s campaign focused on exaggerated dangers posed by
Mexican immigrants and Muslims, and his solution accordingly focused
on banning further entry of such groups into the U.S. 61 Haney López
and Reich suggest that “Democrats develop a narrative about how
political opportunists have used race and gender to divide us, to
demonize government in the eyes of many working-class whites, and to
prevent us from joining together in a broad-based coalition to fight
widening inequalities of income, wealth, and political power.” 62
The suppression of voting rights plays a central role in the
subversion of democracy. 63 The radical right does not hesitate to fund
efforts to intimidate voters, harkening back to similar efforts during the

57.

Id. at 176–81.

58.

Id. at 179.

59.

Id. at 158.

60.

Ian Haney López & Robert Reich, The Way Forward for Democrats Is to
Address Both Class and Race, The Nation (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.
thenation.com/article/the-way-forward-for-democrats-is-to-address-bothclass-and-race/ [https://perma.cc/W4XQ-2RVE].

61.

Id.

62.

Id.; see also Sellers, supra note 29, at 1529–32 (showing how Donald
Trump mobilized political support around white-identity politics and an
aggressively racist agenda).

63.

Haney López, supra note 48, at 159.
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Jim Crow era. 64 These efforts, typically aimed at minority communities,
operate under the guise of voter-fraud myths. 65 According to Haney
López: “Despite intensive, highly motivated efforts to find voter fraud,
the data suggests that voter impersonation happens with roughly the
same frequency that persons are struck and killed by lightening [sic].”66
In fact, President Trump’s commission to find voter fraud quietly failed
in its mission. 67 Nevertheless, the right argues in favor of disenfranch–
ising poor people, in favor of restrictive voter identification laws, and
in favor of felony-disenfranchisement laws. 68 All of this activity enjoys
billionaires’ support, particularly through the Koch-funded American
Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”). 69 In moments of candor, their
objective of restoring an oligarchy in America becomes clear, as the
founder of ALEC once stated: “I don’t want everybody to vote. . . . As
a matter of fact, our leverage in the elections quite candidly goes up as
the voting populace goes down.” 70
These voter-suppression efforts effectively changed the political
landscape. After the 2010 mid-term elections, ALEC successfully
introduced more than 180 bills to restrict voting rights across the
nation. 71 For example, according to a University of Wisconsin study, in
Wisconsin, which Donald Trump won by about 22,000 votes statewide, 72 a new voter-ID law deterred or prevented about 25,000 predom–
64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id. (citing Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Truth About “Voter
Fraud” (2006), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/d/download_file_38347.pdf [https://perma.cc/XET3-GJKU]
(“Raising the unsubstantiated specter of mass voter fraud suits a part–
icular policy agenda. . . . Fraud by individual voters is both irrational and
extremely rare.”) (emphasis omitted)).

67.

Marina Villeneuve, Report: Trump Commission Did Not Find Widespread
Voter Fraud, Associated Press (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/
f5f6a73b2af546ee97816bb35e82c18d [https://perma.cc/W247-AW5u].

68.

Haney López, supra note 48, at 160–61.

69.

Ari Natter, Koch-Funded Group Prods Trump’s EPA to Say Climate
Change Not a Risk, Bloomberg (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2017-11-15/coal-funded-alec-prods-trump-to-say-climatechange-not-a-risk [https://perma.cc/V6SH-TKVM].

70.

Haney López, supra note 48, at 161. For a video of the statement, see
People for the American Way, Paul Weyrich—“I Don’t Want Everybody
to Vote” (Goo Goo), YouTube (Jun. 8, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=8GBAsFwPglw [https://perma.cc/JD5G-5R5B].

71.

MacLean, supra note 30, at 231.

72.

Wisconsin Election Comm’n, Canvass Results for 2016 General
Election 1 (2016), available at https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.
gov/files/Statewide%20Results%20All%20Offices%20%28post-Presidential%
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inantly lower-income citizens from casting their ballots in Milwaukee
and Dane Counties alone. 73 The study also found that “8.3% of white
registrants were deterred, compared to 27.5% of African Americans.”74
No study can certainly determine how these voters would vote if not
deterred or prevented from doing so, but a functioning democracy
requires leaders committed to securing the vote, not to preventing
citizens from voting. 75 The leaders advocating for restrictive voting laws
seek to thwart democracy, and to use race instrumentally to do so, with
full knowledge that minority voters will be disproportionately disen–
franchised. 76
In terms of actual policy impact, the Trump Administration’s tax
cut, tilted heavily towards the rich and adding to the nation’s debt
burden while delivering modest benefits to most Americans, proves the
20recount%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7SM-BNN9].
73.

Press Release, Election Research Ctr. at the Univ. of Wis., Voter ID Study
Shows Turnout Effects in 2016 Wisconsin Presidential Election (Sept. 25,
2017) [hereinafter Wisconsin Voter ID Study] (available at https://elections.
wiscweb.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/483/2018/02/Voter-ID-StudyRelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ8Q-G9KC]). “Roughly 80% of registrants
who were deterred from voting by the ID law, and 77% of those prevented
from voting, cast ballots in the 2012 election.” Id. Of course, “[t]he
burdens of voter ID fell disproportionately on low-income and minority
populations. Among low-income registrants (household income under
$25,000), 21.1% were deterred, compared to 7.2% for those over $25,000.
Among high-income registrants (over $100,000 household income), 2.7%
were deterred.” Id. While these numbers dramatize the kind of oligarchy
the radical right works to achieve, it is impossible to know with certainty
if the ID law changed the outcome of the election. See Eugene Kiely,
FactChecking Clinton’s Voter Suppression Claims, FactCheck.org
(Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/03/factchecking-clintonsvoter-suppression-claims/ [https://perma.cc/2PWV-423M] (explaining
that the Wisconsin report could not accurately assess the link between the
drop in voter turnout and the new ID laws).

74.

Wisconsin Voter ID Study, supra note 73.

75.

Indeed, one factor in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy
is voter turnout. EIU Democracy Index, supra note 6, at 7.

76.

Dan Hopkins, What We Know About Voter ID Laws, FiveThirtyEight
(Aug. 21, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-weknow-about-voter-id-laws/ [https://perma.cc/M8NP-J4L5] (citing Seth
C. McKee, Politics is Local: State Legislator Voting on Restrictive Voter
Identification Legislation, Res. & Pol., July–Sept. 2015, at 1, 6
(“Republicans are much more supportive of restrictive voter ID
legislation . . . . It is also worth noting that, in alignment with the
coalitional bases of support for the major parties, among Republican
legislators, a higher black district population increases legislators’ support
for voter ID, whereas among Democratic lawmakers, a higher black
district population reduces legislators’ likelihood of voting in favor of
restrictive voter ID legislation.”) (citations omitted)).
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point that dog-whistle politics aim at helping the wealthy become
wealthier rather than specifically intending to harm minorities. 77 Those
in the top-twenty percent of the income distribution scored eight times
the tax benefits from those cuts than those in the bottom-twenty
percent. 78 These gains add to a forty-year run of elite gains (and stag–
nation for most Americans) in after-tax income driven primarily by
relentless tax cuts for the very wealthy. 79
The Trump Administration also waged an unprecedented and
unprincipled war on regulation. Specifically, it mandated that govern–
ment agencies promulgate no new regulations without repealing two
regulations. 80 Deregulation creates further opportunities for elite
enrich–ment, ranging from the fraudulent peddling of subprime
mortgage debt to profiteering from underpriced carbon. 81 Concentrated
wealth naturally leads to elites subverting the law and regulations
through job offers, campaign contributions, electioneering expenditures,
and a wide range of patronage benefits. 82 Concentrated wealth similarly
opens wide opportunities for the social construction of knowledge to
further facilitate profiteering through an intellectually polluted body
politic and an ultimately corrupted law. 83 All of this allows elites to
exploit the system for windfall payoffs while imposing trillions of dollars
in costs upon the global economy. 84
The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 provides a textbook example.
The crisis originated in the political power of financial elites to free
themselves from regulations and laws dating back to the New Deal.85
77.

See Ben Steverman et al., A Year After the Middle Class Tax Cut, the
Rich Are Winning, Bloomberg (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.
com/graphics/2018-tax-plan-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/TX5K-GZEJ]
(analyzing the effects of President Trump’s tax cuts).

78.

Id.

79.

Since 1980, after-tax income for about half of all Americans has stagnated
at about $16,000 per annum (adjusted for inflation), while income for
those in the top-one percent of the income distribution soared from
$420,000 to $1.3 million. Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. Econ.
553, 557 (2018). The highest growth rate lies at the very top (0.0001
percentile) of the population. Id. at 579. This concentration of wealth in
very few hands explains the subversion of law and regulation that drove
all aspects of the financial crisis. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 1–5, 36–37.

80.

Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017).

81.

Ramirez, supra note 8, at 8–9.

82.

Id. at 3–5.

83.

Id.

84.

Id. at 1–10.

85.

Id. at 1–16.
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The crisis contributed to the greatest upward transfer of wealth in
modern American history. 86 Financial elites took out-sized compen–
sation payments while the American and global economies paid the
tab. 87 Indeed, a recent assessment put the cost at $70,000 per U.S.
resident. 88 Despite the loot garnered, no senior manager at any major
bank faced any real legal accountability under the rigged financial
regulatory and corporate governance systems. 89 Global warming
promises even more costs upon the general population for the gross
enrichment of carbon-selling elites. 90
Thus, the radical right’s efforts to reinstall an oligarchy through
the suppression of democracy and dog-whistle politics have achieved
great success. The relentless tax cuts and drive for deregulation over
the past forty years witnessed a remarkable after-tax income explosion
at the very tip-top (top .001%) of the income distribution at the expense
of over ninety-nine percent of all Americans. 91 Only legal and regulatory
restructuring currently suffices to explain this aberrational increase in
86.

For example:
During the crisis, African-Americans experienced a 53% decline
and Hispanic a 66% decline compared to a 16% decline for white
households. There was [also] a significant racial difference in
wealth recovery after the Crisis . . . from 2010 to 2013, the median
wealth of white households increased from $138,600 to $141,900,
or by 2.4%. By contrast, the median wealth of black households
fell 33.7%, from $16,600 in 2010 to $11,000 in 2013. Among
Hispanics, median wealth decreased by 14.3%, from $16,000 to
$13,700.
Emma Coleman Jordan, The Hidden Structures of Inequality: The Federal
Reserve and a Cascade of Failures, 2 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Aff. 107, 112
(2017). Furthermore, across racial groups, the top ten percent enjoyed
relative wealth gains while the rest of Americans lost. Id. at 134.

87.

Patrice Ollivaud & David Turner, The Effect of the Global Financial
Crisis on OECD Potential Output, 2014 OECD J.: Econ. Stud. 41, 48–
49 (2015) (showing output gap in U.S. at 3.3%; Italy, 6.0%; and Greece,
12.9%).

88.

Regis Barnichon et al., The Financial Crisis at 10: Will We Ever
Recover?, FRBSF Econ. Letter (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/
economic-research/files/el2018-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DXD-HSGP]
(finding that “the U.S. economy remains significantly smaller than it
should be based on its pre-crisis growth trend” and that “[t]he size of
those losses suggests that the level of output is unlikely to revert to its
pre-crisis trend level. This represents a lifetime present-value income loss
of about $70,000 for every American.”).

89.

Mary K. Ramirez & Steven A. Ramirez, The Case for the Corp–
orate Death Penalty xi–xiv (2017).

90.

Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of Climate Change and
Inequality (forthcoming 2020).

91.

Piketty et al., supra note 79, at 578.
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inequality; in other words, inequality reflects the legal re-engineering of
income distribution in favor of the wealthy and powerful. 92 These facts
profoundly altered political outcomes. Law re-channeled power in favor
of the very wealthy and entrenched their economic and political
privileges.
The next part of this Article demonstrates the Supreme Court’s
recent role in concretizing the high income inequality arising from forty
years of legal change favoring the very wealthy.

II. The Supreme Court’s New Oligarchy
Another major flaw in American democracy is political and racial
gerrymandering, as the Supreme Court itself acknowledges. 93 On March
29, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases that
raised issues relating to political and racial gerrymandering. 94 Some
commentators suggested that the Court should consider political
realities and the “vastness of white identity politics” 95 in determining
Equal Protection violations, as it did in the unanimous decision of
White v. Regester. 96 Instead, the Court held that partisan gerryman–
92.

Id. at 604–05.

93.

The Supreme Court Does Not Like Gerrymandering, Economist (Mar.
28, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/03/30/thesupreme-court-does-not-like-gerrymandering [https:perma.cc/R4AG-CPT5].

94.

Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Divided and Hard to Read on
Partisan Gerrymandering, SCOUTUSblog (Mar. 26, 2019, 3:45 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/argument-analysis-justices-dividedand-hard-to-read-on-partisan-gerrymandering/ [https://perma.cc/A8MMZNRB].

95.

Sellers, supra note 29, at 1532–60.

96.

412 U.S. 755 (1973). The Court, invalidating multimember districts used
to dilute minority voting power, wrote:
[W]e have entertained claims that multimember districts are being
used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of
racial groups. To sustain such claims, it is not enough that the
racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative
seats in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs’ burden
is to produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in question—that its members
had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.
Id. at 765–66 (citations omitted). The Court has since overruled this
approach. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (“Our decisions . . . have made clear that action by a State that
is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”).

100

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
Deracialization and Democracy

dering presents political questions beyond judicial review, essentially
giving a green light to any racial gerrymandering parading as merely
political gerrymandering. 97
Haney López suggests that the GOP more aggressively carves out
Congressional districts favorable to GOP rule than do Democrats. 98 The
facts support his position: “The AP scrutinized the outcomes of all 435
U.S. House races . . . using a new statistical method of calculating
partisan advantage designed to detect potential political gerryman–
dering.” 99 It found that “among the two dozen most populated states
that determine the vast majority of Congress, there were nearly three
times as many with Republican-tilted U.S. House districts.” 100 This
permitted the GOP to enjoy a ten percent advantage in total House
seats with only a one percent popular-vote advantage. 101 In 2018,
gerrymandering protected many GOP seats from shifting to the Demo–
crats. 102 On this front, some leaders now advocate for non-partisan
redistricting. 103
The Supreme Court figures prominently in any account of the
installation of a new American oligarchy. 104 Professor MacLean notes
97.

See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019); Jon
Greenbaum & Kristen Clarke, Gerrymandering Symposium: The
Racial Implications of Yesterday’s Partisan Gerrymandering Decision,
SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2019/06/gerrymandering-symposium-the-racial-implications-of-todayspartisan-gerrymandering-decision/ [https://perma.cc/Z5HX-N86M].

98.

Haney López, supra note 48, at 161 (“The Republicans won control of
the House by a 234 to 201 margin, yet the Democrats cumulatively
received 1.4 million more votes.”).

99.

David A. Lieb, AP Analysis Shows How Gerrymandering Benefited GOP
in 2016, Associated Press (June 25, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/
e3c5cc51faba4b7fb67d8a3f996bdaca [https://perma.cc/8Y2M-GB7S].

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Brett Neely & Sean McMinn, Voters Rejected Gerrymandering in 2018, but
Some Lawmakers Try to Hold Power, NPR (Dec. 28, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2018/12/28/675763553/voters-rejected-gerrymandering-in2018-but-some-lawmakers-try-to-hold-power [https://perma.cc/3CWL-5V3E].
103. Id.; see also The Supreme Court Does Not Like Gerrymandering, supra
note 93 (“Justice Neil Gorsuch picked up on this in response to the claim
that the Supreme Court ‘must act because nobody else can’. About 20
states, he noted, have ‘dealt with this problem through citizen initiatives’
handing over map-drawing to bipartisan or independent commissions, and
a ‘bunch more’ will be on the ballot in 2020. Justice Kavanaugh agreed
that ‘a fair amount of activity’ in the states may free the Supreme Court
from the ‘big lift’ of policing partisan gerrymandering.”).
104. According to Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne, Jr.:
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that during the nineteenth century the Court aimed to preserve the
privileges of the powerful, and today the radical right openly seeks to
control the Supreme Court for its project to wrest control of the
government from the democratically empowered masses. 105 Like Prof–
essor MacLean, Professor Haney López also zeros in on the Supreme
Court as the key institution for the subversion of democracy. 106 The
Court’s power and its lack of democratic accountability led the radical
right to seize control of it by all means necessary.
The Senate recently politicized the Court through historic
overreach. It simply defied President Obama’s constitutional power to
nominate Supreme Court justices when it refused to vote on the
Supreme Court nomination of Merrick Garland. 107 The installations of
On cases involving the right of Americans to vote and the ability
of a very small number of very rich people to exercise unlimited
influence on the political process, Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr. and his four allies always side with the wealthy, the powerful
and the forces that would advance the political party that put
them on the court.
E.J. Dionne Jr., Supreme Oligarchy, Wash. Post (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-jr-supreme-oligarchy/
2014/04/06/823f15ea-bc2e-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html?utm_term=
.77883049456a [perma.cc/P3HN-3L9J]; see also Chemerinsky, supra note
10 (concluding that, institutionally, the Court operates to protect the
interests of dominant political and economic elites rather than individual
rights or long-term values).
105. MacLean, supra note 30, at 227–30 (detailing efforts to use the Supreme
Court to permanently disable the federal and state governments to enact
progressive legislation similar to pre-Depression notions of government
power) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down
state labor regulation based upon Fourteenth Amendment)); Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (narrowing the scope of
the Commerce Clause)).
106. See Haney López, supra note 48, at 144, 161.
107. Ron Elving, What Happened With Merrick Garland In 2016 And Why It
Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/
06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-itmatters-now [https://perma.cc2LUE-ZHW2]. According to one scholar:
[The] door has now been opened to . . . politically motivated
Senate moratoriums on Supreme Court nominations. The
encroachment and impairment that it entails cast[s] grave doubt
on its constitutionality, and it currently finds no safe harbor in
historical practice. Whether the imposition of such a moratorium
will continue to present a grave constitutional question, however,
depends on what tradition develops now that the door has been
opened. The potential evils of further expansion are already audible
just over the horizon. Calling out the probable constitutional
invalidity of the McConnell moratorium, clearly repudiating it,
and preventing a repetition and expansion are imperative if the
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Justice Kavanaugh as well as Justice Gorsuch produced a historic first:
justices nominated by a president who lacked majority-vote approval108
and confirmed by a Senate that lacked majority-vote approval. 109 This
could operate as arguably the greatest triumph of minority rule in U.S.
history. 110 It is certainly the crowning achievement of a long-standing
campaign by the radical right to cement long-term control of the Court
by all means necessary. 111
Recent case law shows that the oligarchs’ efforts have paid off.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission112 illustrates well the
practice is not to gain a constitutional safe harbor in a newly
established tradition.
J. Stephen Clark, Senators Can’t Be Choosers: Moratoriums on Supreme
Court Nominations and the Separation of Powers, 106 Ky. L.J. 337, 408
(2018).
108. Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote,
CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/
donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html [https://
perma.cc/3FWM-DASB].
109. See Rick Noack, How to Explain to Someone Living Abroad that
Democrats Can Have over 10 Million more Senate Votes and Still Lose,
Wash. Post (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/
11/07/how-explain-someone-living-abroad-that-democrats-can-have-overmillion-more-senate-votes-still-lose/?utm_term=.14a4add505c3 [https://
perma.cc/SM77-QNQ5] (describing how Democratic candidates in both
2016 and 2018 received millions more votes than Republican candidates,
yet the GOP controls the Senate and, thus, the Supreme Court
nomination process); see also Aaron Blake, Democrats Won the Senate
Popular Vote! Which is Both True and Terribly Misleading, Wash. Post
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/
11/29/the-most-bogus-stat-of-the-2016-election-how-democrats-won-thesenate-popular-vote/?utm_term=.f1905bb3a2ce [https://perma.cc/UE5LCZ6V].
110. See Michael Tomasky, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y.
Times, (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/
supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/QHN4-2E8X]
(“[I]n an age of 5-4 partisan decisions, we’re on the verge of having a fivemember majority who figure to radically rewrite our nation’s laws. And
four of them will have been narrowly approved by senators representing
minority will.”).
111. See Brandon Bartels, It Took Conservatives 50 Years to Get a Reliable
Majority on the Supreme Court. Here Are 3 Reasons Why., Wash. Post
(June 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2018/06/29/it-took-conservatives-50-years-to-get-a-reliable-majority-onthe-supreme-court-here-are-3-reasons-why/?utm_term=.56227cff95c9
[https://perma.cc/XT6D-TTP7] (explaining the Republicans’ emphasis
on appointing “strict constructionist” jurists and the Senate’s elimination
of the filibuster for judicial appointments).
112. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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central importance of the Supreme Court to reigning in democracy by
all means necessary. 113 In Citizens United, the Court ruled that
corporations enjoy the same free-speech rights as individuals, and
therefore, governmental restrictions on a corporation’s political speech
must survive strict scrutiny, the most demanding level of judicial review
of governmental actions. 114 More specifically, the Court held that
corporations are entitled to First Amendment free-speech protections
and, as a result, corporate money spent on political electioneering
independent of a campaign cannot be limited by campaign-finance
restrictions. 115 Emblematic of the judicial activism driving this outcome,
the Court overruled two of its own precedents on this point, and it also
limited bi-partisan legislation. 116 The billionaires and CEOs seeking
more concentrated wealth and power won an important political gift as
a direct result of this legal stretch: the unlimited use of corporate
(shareholder) wealth, rather than their own cash, to engage in elect–
ioneering. 117 Lower courts extended the logic of Citizens United to
invalidate all limitations on independent electioneering expenditures.118
The Court doubled down on further empowering the wealthy in
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. 119 There, in a 5–4 deci–
sion, the conservative majority ruled that limits on aggregate federal
113. See id. at 365–66 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990) and McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S.
93 (2003)).
114. Id. at 340–43.
115. Id. at 372 (holding unconstitutional the restriction of corporate independent
electioneering expenditures under 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012)).
116. Id. at 365–66. The unconstitutional statutory section was part of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81.
117. Previously, corporate funds could not be used for electioneering purposes,
forcing CEOs and corporate leaders to finance politicking for their chosen
candidates from their own capital (typically through Political Action
Committees (“PACs”)). See generally Bret Shaw, Note, It’s the End of
the World as We Know It (and I Feel Fine): How Comparative Campaign
Finance Suggests that Citizens United May Not Be the End of the
World . . . and that the United States Should Consider Other Policy
Alternatives, 31 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 159, 161–64 (2014)
(describing the evolution of regulating corporate political activity).
Moreover, “[t]here is no enforceable mandate that the CEO consider
shareholder interests when deploying for political ends the extraordinary
capital available to the public firm.” andré douglas pond cummings et al.,
Toward a Critical Corporate Law Pedagogy and Scholarship, 92 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 397, 418 (2014).
118. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
119. 572 U.S. 185 (2014).

104

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
Deracialization and Democracy

campaign contributions ran afoul of the First Amendment. 120 Chief
Justice John Roberts stated: “The Government may no more restrict
how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell
a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.” 121 The dissent
argued that “[t]aken together with [Citizens United], today’s decision
eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant
incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy
that those laws were intended to resolve.” 122 The Court seems
determined to prevent any democratic pressure for election reform from
achieving success based upon an expansive, even contrived, reading of
the First Amendment. 123 Jeffrey Toobin suggests that more election
deregulation by judicial fiat is likely: “the language of Chief Justice
John Roberts’s opinion suggests that the Court remains committed
to . . . the deregulation of American political campaigns.” 124
This deregulation of money in politics represents a massive shift in
power and influence, which carries with it significant racial implications
because wealth is distributed in accordance with our racial hierarchy,
as is corporate power. 125 “Put simply, the Supreme Court transferred
power from the diverse body politic as a whole to a small handful of
non-diverse corporate elites.” 126 For example, only three African
Americans hold CEO positions in Fortune 500 firms today. 127 Only
eleven Latinos hold CEO positions. 128 Women total five percent of all
120. Id. at 193. There, the Court effectively overruled Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), insofar as aggregate contribution limits are concerned. Id.
at 232–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 204 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 233 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
123. See id. (suggesting that the majority “misconstrue[d]” the constitutional
interests implicated).
124. Jeffrey Toobin, The John Roberts Project, New Yorker (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-john-robertsproject [https://perma.cc/TF6F-YXKG].
125. See Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and
Campaign Finance, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 987, 989 (2002) (arguing that allowing
money into politics “effectively enshrine[s] the existing distribution of
property as a baseline for political advantage”).
126. cummings et al., supra note 117, at 421.
127. Ellen McGirt, raceAhead: Only Three Black CEOs in the Fortune 500,
Fortune (Mar. 1, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/03/01/raceaheadthree-black-ceos/ [https://perma.cc/5847-M2PP].
128. Robert Reiss, Latino CEOs Share Insights On Business Success, Forbes
(Feb. 27, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertreiss/2018/
02/27/latino-ceos-share-insights-on-business-success/#7dc871b52264 [https://
perma.cc/N65X-LNSC].
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Fortune 500 CEOs. 129 “[T]he apex of corporate leadership remains a
bastion of white male supremacy.” 130 In terms of wealth, only seven
members of the “Forbes 400 Richest Americans” are African American
or Latino, and none made the top one hundred. 131 It begs credulity that
the conservative Court majority in Citizens United failed to apprehend
this distribution of power and wealth when it radically shifted power to
CEOs and other billionaires by overturning the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act as well as its own precedents. 132
While the Roberts Court zealously guards the rights of those with
money to freely influence elections, it displays hostility to individuals
seeking the right to vote. For example, in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph
Institute, 133 the Court upheld Ohio’s purge of its voter rolls despite
Congressional legislation aimed at stopping the very practice Ohio
used. 134 The Harvard Law Review argued that the case transcended the
statute at issue:
Voter suppression is as American as apple pie. Between the 2012
and 2016 elections, for example, fourteen states enacted laws
making it harder for citizens to vote. These laws affect minority
voters with particular intensity. Last Term, in Husted v. A. Philip
Randolph Institute, the Court upheld an Ohio law that could
ultimately allow the state to remove from its voter rolls close to
one million registered voters. While cast as a dry exercise in
statutory interpretation, Husted is best understood through the
lens of the nation’s history of race-based voter suppression. 135

129. These Are the Women CEOs Leading Fortune 500 Companies, Fortune
(June 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/07/fortune-500-women-ceos/
[https://perma.cc/N2BN-JQJF].
130. cummings et al., supra note 117, at 411. If the Court intended to entrench
white male power, it would be impossible to do so more efficaciously than
to give white CEOs unlimited power to spend shareholder wealth on their
own interests without regard to shareholders’ voices. Id. at 421.
131. Chuck Collins & Josh Hoxie, Inst. for Policy Studies, Billionaire
Bonanza 5 (2017), available at https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/11/BILLIONAIRE-BONANZA-2017-FinalV.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5QQU-2PUT].
132. See cummings et al., supra note 117, at 417–23, for a comprehensive critique
of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
on these grounds.
133. 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018).
134. Id. at 1850 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. National Voter Registration Act—Statutory Interpretation—Election Law—
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 437
(2018) (footnotes omitted).
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The Review also suggested that the Court should not ignore the
long history of minority disenfranchisement when weighing statutory
meaning:
To ignore the context in which these laws arise—the context of
this nation’s history—is to betray the legacies of so many who
have fought and died for the franchise. Even if one assumes Ohio’s
law was a good-faith effort to ensure the accuracy of voter rolls,
the Court’s decision offers a roadmap for states whose motives
are more suspect. To date, at least a dozen states—all of them
controlled by Republicans—have indicated that they intend to
adopt a similar plan to purge voter rolls. These purge laws will
work in concert with other racially inequitable voter-suppression
tactics like restrictions on early voting, stringent registration
requirements, and felon disenfranchisement—many of which are
common in states controlled by Republicans. Though
undoubtedly less blatant than Jim Crow laws, these tactics may
be similarly effective given the winner-take-all nature of American
elections. 136

Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, urged minority communities to act
against the Roberts Court’s efforts for disenfranchisement, stating:
“Communities that are disproportionately affected by unnecessarily
harsh registration laws should not tolerate efforts to marginalize their
influence in the political process, nor should allies who recognize blatant
unfairness stand idly by.” 137
Blatant unfairness also describes other Roberts Court efforts to
favor money over democracy. This far-right majority on the Court also
applied new legal doctrine 138 to overturn a key part of the Voting Rights

136. Id. at 445–46 (footnotes omitted). Other commentators echo this
assessment. See, e.g., Joshua Douglas, Supreme Court Takes a Giant Step
Backward on Voter Rights, CNN (June 11, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/06/11/opinions/supreme-court-makes-it-harder-to-vote/
index.html [https://perma.cc/3KP4-DLKK] (“The Court once served as
a bastion of voting rights protection, striking down state practices that
infringed upon that fundamental right. . . . Today’s decision, however, follows
a more troubling trend in failing to protect fully the most important right
in our democracy.”).
137. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1865 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
138. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The
Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2109, 2133
n.103 (2015) (“The legal commentariat generally viewed the doctrine as
an invention.”); Eric Posner, Supreme Court on the Voting Rights Act:
Chief Justice John Roberts Struck Down Part of the Law for the Lamest
of Reasons, Slate (June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2013/06/supreme-court-on-the-voting-rights-act-chief-justice-johnroberts-struck-down-part-of-the-law-for-the-lamest-of-reasons.html [https://
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Act of 1965 (“VRA”), 139 despite the fact that the Court previously
upheld the very same provision. 140 In Shelby County v. Holder, 141 the
Court invalidated section 4(b) of the VRA, which required certain
states to obtain preclearance on changes to voting requirements. 142 The
Court found that “the conditions that originally justified [§ 5] no longer
characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.” 143 Dissenting, Justice
Ginsburg argued that “the Constitution vests broad power in Congress
to protect the right to vote, and in particular to combat racial
discrimination in voting. This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
Congress’ prerogative to use any rational means in exercise of its power
in this area.” 144 In sum, “[t]he Court’s conservative majority believes
that the First Amendment gives wealthy donors and powerful
corporations the carte blanche right to buy an election but that the
Fifteenth Amendment does not give Americans the right to vote free of
racial discrimination.” 145 The cases above moved the U.S. in the
perma.cc/S8AR-4YHE]; Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling
is About the Conservative Imagination, Slate (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/06/the-supreme-court-andthe-voting-rights-act-striking-down-the-law-is-all-about-conservativesimagination.html [https://perma.cc/KVQ2-BLT4]. Some commentators
suggest the proper precedent for “equal sovereignty” rests in the
Confederate States of America. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis et al., The
Persistence of the Confederate Narrative, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 301, 356
(2017) (“Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, embellished the
Confederate narrative, elevating the status of States to both horizontal
and vertical sovereignty . . . .”).
139. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (relevant portions codified at 52
U.S.C. § 10303 (2012)).
140. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see also Northwest
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009)
(declining to hold unconstitutional VRA pre-clearance provisions after
reauthorization of the Act in 2006).
141. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
142. Id. at 557; see also id. at 551 (“In 1965, the States could be divided into
two groups: those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter
registration and turnout, and those without those characteristics. . . .
Today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting
Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.”).
143. Id. at 535.
144. Id. at 570 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Franita Tolson, The
Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U. L. Rev.
317, 392 (2019) (“The VRA is a permissible exercise of federal power,
justifiable pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
the Elections Clause.”).
145. Ari Berman, The Supreme Court’s Ideology: More Money, Less Voting,
The Nation (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/supremecourts-ideology-more-money-less-voting/ [https://perma.cc/D8E4-U62Y].
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direction of a new oligarchy. The lessons the Supreme Court teaches
through those cases are that precedent matters little and that the very
concept of constitutionality is politically pliable.
All of these attacks on democracy have taken a toll on our
democracy and moved us toward an oligarchy. In fact, political
scientists concluded in 2014 that “if policymaking is dominated by
powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent
Americans,” as their analyses showed, “then America’s claims to being
a democratic society are seriously threatened.” 146 The political scientists
assembled a unique database of 1,779 federal-policy cases between 1981
and 2002 which provided data regarding surveyed citizens’ income as
well as a host of other factors, such as clear policy outcomes. 147 They
found that after controlling for all other factors, economic elites (defined
as those at the ninetieth percentile or above) and business-related
special interest groups predominated in influencing policy outcomes.148
Mass-interest groups held some sway, but only half as much as businessoriented groups, leading the authors to find: “These business groups are
far more numerous and active; they spend much more money; and they
tend to get their way.” 149 The study finds that the U.S. political system
operates as a textbook example of an oligarchy: “When the preferences
of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are
controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have
only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon
public policy.” 150 Many other scholars agree. 151

146. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 Persps. on Pols. 564,
577 (2014).
147. Id. at 568. Gilens and Page excluded issues not committed to democratic
negotiation, such as Supreme Court decisions or those requiring a
Constitutional Amendment. See id.
148. Id. at 572, 574–75.
149. Id. at 574–75 (“The influence coefficients for both mass-based and
business-oriented interest groups are positive . . . but the coefficient for
business groups is nearly twice as large as that for the mass groups.”).
150. Id. at 575. An oligarchy is a government by the few, or a small group of
people. Oligarchy, Lexico, https://lexico.com/en/definition/oligarcy [https://
perma.cc/NJQ9-HMFD] (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
151. E.g., Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political
Economy of the New Gilded Age 6 (2d ed. 2016) (“[T]he opinions
of . . . ordinary citizens in the bottom one-third of the income distribution
have no discernible impact on the behavior of their elected represen–
tatives.”); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69
Pub. Opinion Q. 778, 794 (2005) (“[I]nfluence over actual policy outcomes
appears to be reserved almost exclusively for those at the top of the
income distribution.”); id. at 778 (“[R]epresentational biases of this
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The issues of current import to these new ruling oligarchs do not
include any efforts to breakdown the American racial hierarchy. On the
contrary, they seem most interested in limiting government spending,
lowering taxes, deregulating business, and restricting the influence of
democracy. 152 Their pursuit of this agenda is intimately tied to the
preservation of the racial hierarchy that continues to fester in our
society. 153 Their reactionary agenda relies upon the perpetuation of that
hierarchy both as a mechanism of drawing political strength from the
animus it engenders and as a mechanism of excluding disinvited voices
from our democracy. 154 While they themselves may not act with racial
animus, they need to engender such animus in the body politic for their
stealth plan to impose an oligarchy to succeed. 155
As shown above, moreover, the movement does not abide by norms
or precedent, only naked power (including the power of dog-whistle
politics and mass voter disenfranchisement) to impose its will. 156 They
pursue their oligarchy through stealth and only minimally respect
magnitude call into question the very democratic character of our
society.”).
152. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
153. See Haney López, supra note 48, at 221 (“[A]meliorating racial inequality
is a precondition to ending racial politics. So long as society remains riven
by racial divisions, racial demagoguery will remain a threat to the middle
class.”) (emphasis omitted). Without the support of dog-whistle politics,
the radical right in the U.S. would fail. See id.
154. As Professor Haney López highlights, three out of ten African-American
males will suffer disenfranchisement at some point in their lives. Id. at
160.
155. Professor MacLean describes the true motive of the libertarian cause:
The libertarian cause . . . was never really about freedom . . . . It
was about the promotion of crippling division among the people
so as to end any interference with what those who held vast power
over others believed should be their prerogatives. Its leaders had
no scruples about enlisting white supremacy to achieve capital
supremacy.
MacLean, supra note 30, at 234.
156. Professor Haney López describes the practical effects of voter ID laws:
In the wake of Obama’s 2008 election, the GOP became even more
aggressive in seeking to disenfranchise minorities and the poor
through various mechanisms, including restrictive voter ID laws.
In 2011, 38 states introduced legislation likely to impede voting
by these groups. This extraordinary number reflected a concerted
effort on the part of some Republican officials—and their
billionaire backers—to drive down voting by Democratic
constituencies.
Haney López, supra note 48, at 160.
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precedent or the rule of law. 157 They spurn democratic negotiation in
favor of minority rule. 158 They pursue their agenda by all means
necessary, including fabricating new-fangled legal doctrines and rever–
sing legal precedents. 159 The nature of their attack on democracy knows
little restraint. 160
157. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 234 (“[T]oday, knowing that the
majority does not share their goals and would stop them if they
understood the endgame, the team of paid operatives seeks to win by
stealth.”).
158. The radical right is closing in on holding a veto-proof supermajority even
though the majority of voters do not support it. See id. at 231–32
(describing the effect of gerrymandering on American voting).
159. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S.
310 (2010), the Roberts Court struck down the Bi-Partisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act of 2002, and overturned two of its own precedents:
“Today Justice Kennedy wrote for a court majority of the five
conservative justices. He effectively wiped out a key provision of
Congress’[s] 2002 campaign finance reform. He also did indeed strike down
Austin and parts of McConnell.” Richard Hasen, Money Grubbers, Slate
(Jan. 21, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/01/the-supremecourt-kills-campaign-finance-reform-in-citizens-united.html [https://perma.cc/
2AA7-2NB6].
160. For example, in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), the Roberts
Court struck down legislation that passed the Senate by a vote of 98–0
and passed the House by an overwhelming vote. Id. at 565 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Nevertheless, according to conservative former jurist Richard
Posner:
The majority opinion in Shelby acknowledges that racial
discrimination in voting continues, but notes that the situation
has improved since 1965 and that the procedures in the current
Voting Rights Act do not make a clean fit with the current forms
and pattern of discrimination. Ordinarily however a federal
statute is not invalidated on the ground that it’s dated. . . . And
the criticisms of the statute in the majority opinion are rather
tepid. That’s why the court’s invocation of “equal sovereignty” is
an indispensable prop of the decision. But, as I said, there is no
doctrine of equal sovereignty. The opinion rests on air.
Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling is About the
Conservative Imagination, Slate (June 26, 2013), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2013/06/the-supreme-court-and-the-voting-rights-act-strikingdown-the-law-is-all-about-conservatives-imagination.html [https://perma.cc/
KVQ2-BLT4]. “Roberts is able to cite only the weakest support for this
principle—a handful of very old cases that address entirely different
matters.” Eric Posner, Supreme Court on the Voting Rights Act: Chief
Justice John Roberts Struck Down Part of the Law for the Lamest of
Reasons, Slate (June 25, 2013), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/
06/supreme-court-on-the-voting-rights-act-chief-justice-john-roberts-struckdown-part-of-the-law-for-the-lamest-of-reasons.html [https://perma.cc/
S8AR-4YHE].
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As such, the movement to impose an oligarchy lights the way for
the means to unwind their handiwork; democracy will be saved only by
pursuing all paths available under law to restore democracy and to
reverse engineer our democracy from where the oligarchs leave it today.
That means limiting deference to traditional norms and respect of
precedent, as the conservative majority on the Court clearly does, until
the transcendent value of democracy is vindicated and majority rule is
restored. 161 The rule of law requires that the law secure fundamental
rights, including the right to vote. Democracy and the rule of law enjoy
close and mutually essential links; 162 thus, defending a vibrant demo–
cracy defends the rule of law.

161. See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. Thus, for example, a
fair assessment of the precedential value of the “equal sovereignty”
doctrine used to invalidate the VRA would focus on the fact that the
doctrine finds a firmer textual foundation in the Articles of Confederation
rather than the U.S. Constitution. Unlike the Constitution, in the Articles
of Confederation the states retained sovereignty. The word “sovereignty”
does not appear in the U.S. Constitution. Compare Articles of
Confederation of 1781, art. II (“Each State retains its Sovereignty,
freedom and independence”), with U.S. Const. See also Lepore, supra
note 22, at 122, 290 (explaining that the Constitution did not reflect a
confederacy of states but instead invested the people as sovereign
directly).
162. In a commencement address, United States Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
described the role of democracy:
Our efforts to foster democracy, even in areas where it has never
been known, is a noble effort. But it’s based on self interest. Until
we interrupt the cycle of radicalism and repression among the
tyrannies of the world, we will never be safe. In today’s world, our
security depends upon the freedom of others. Democracy starts
with voting and majority rule. But it is successful only when it
has, at its foundation, a society that provides minority rights,
dispenses equal justice, tolerates a free media, and operates under
the rule of law. This concept harnesses individual rights as well as
majority rule to the democratic process. We have grown up in the
United States in a society of laws, not of men. We tend to take
that concept for granted. But in most emerging democracies, the
rule of law is an alien idea, almost incomprehensible. It is critical,
as we promote free elections, that we also promote the rule of law
throughout the world.
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Commencement Address at the SMU
Dedman School of Law (May 14, 2005), in Foreword: Democracy and the
Rule of Law, 58 SMU L. Rev. 495, 495 (2005). In fact, every nation
ranked at the top of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Rating
(strongest adherence to the rule of law) is also rated as a “Full
Democracy” by the EIU Democracy Index. Compare World Justice
Project, supra note 3, at 20, with EIU Democracy Index, supra note 6, at
11, 14, and 24.
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Traditionally the U.S. has pursued that right with vigor, as the
next part will show. Part IV seeks to prove that democratic rule plays
a central, even paramount, role in our modern constitutional republic,
and that minority rule simply cannot be allowed to play the
predominant role it plays today. As such, we posit that extraordinary
efforts to restore democracy are now justified. Part IV demonstrates
that advocating for a democracy over an oligarchy is the apotheosis of
our long history of struggling for democratic rule.

III. Democracy Strikes Back
Consider first the long-term course of the concept democracy in the
life of our own democracy. As shown above, it defies reality to argue
that at its incipiency the U.S. functioned as a democratic republic
instead of an oligarchy. 163 While the definition of an oligarchy turns on
the term few, and no magic number clearly demarcates an oligarchy
from a representative democracy, certainly a system that extends
voting rights to only six percent of the populace and enslaves a signif–
icant percentage of its population cannot qualify as a democratic
republic or a representative democracy. 164 Then additional problems
emerge, as discussed above, in the form of inflating the voting power of
the slaveholders, the Electoral College, and the Senate. 165 None of these
contrivances to save slavery into the indefinite future can hide the
essential fact that the original intent of the Founders was the imposition
of an oligarchy, pure and simple. 166 Nevertheless, since 1789 the
163. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (discussing how the Founders
established the early United States as an oligarchy rather than as a
democratic republic).
165. See Huskerson, supra note 25 (describing the evolution of U.S. voting
laws).
166. Historically, many considered the South “an aggressive slavocracy,” which
effectively dominated the federal government until it failed to maintain
sufficient unity of purpose and cohesion to overcome the economic and
military superiority of the Union forces during the Civil War. See
Chauncy S. Boucher, In re That Aggressive Slavocracy, 8 Miss. Valley
Hist. Rev. 13, 13–15, 79 (1921). This slavocracy pulled the nation into
the annexation of Texas as a slave state in 1845. See Joel Sibley, Storm
Over Texas 91, 175–81 (2005). In 1860, after the election of Abraham
Lincoln, then-President James Buchanan advised the North to amend the
Constitution to protect slavery in all U.S. territories, submit to the
fugitive slave law, “stop criticizing slavery,” and make Cuba a slave state.
James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 251 (1988). In the
late-1850s, slave interests sought to violently expand their power
throughout Central and South America. Lepore, supra note 22, at 281.
Ultimately, the slavocracy’s overreach incited both Northern resistance
and its own destruction in the Civil War. Sibley, supra. Indeed, some
termed the South a “rabid slavocracy” in the aftermath of Lincoln’s
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constitutional trajectory of our nation traces a path to a representative
democracy and constantly affirms a move toward an ever-increasing
democratic form of governance. 167
Indeed, the status of African Americans as citizens or slaves defined
the Civil War. The pro-slavery Constitution installed in 1789 faced
complete destruction (at least in theory) in 1865 after the South
desperately decided to attack the federal government in a violent 168 and
futile attempt to retain indefinitely the ownership of slaves. 169 After
election but prior to the rebels firing on Fort Sumter. McPherson, supra,
at 251. Ever-increasing concentrations of power prove insatiable and
therefore tend toward self-destruction.
167. See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote 295 (rev. ed. 2009)
(“The proportion of the adult population enfranchised is far greater than
it was at the nation’s founding or at the end of the nineteenth century.”).
The ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 effectively doubled
the electorate. Id. at 175. In 1971, the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered
the voting age to eighteen. Id. at 228. The Fourteenth Amendment
introduced the right to vote into the Constitution and effectively
guaranteed suffrage for all males by sanctioning states who denied them
suffrage. Id. at 71–74, 82–83. The Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised
former slaves. Id. at 74–83. This ultimately led to the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, which empowered over one million African-American voters in
the South. Id. at 211–13.
168. After the election of 1860, South Carolina began its insurrection. On
December 20 of that year, its legislature declared that “‘the Union now
subsisting between South Carolina and other states, under the name of
the United States of America, is hereby dissolved.’ After the declaration,
South Carolina set about seizing forts, arsenals, and other strategic
locations within the state.” States Meet to Form Confederacy, History,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/states-meet-to-formconfederacy (last updated July 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/MTL2-J5Y5].
“On April 12, 1861, thirty-four hours of bombardment began the Civil
War. It was the beginning of four years of terrific fighting, North versus
South.” Where the American Civil War Began, Nat’l Park Serv.
https://www.nps.gov/fosu/index.htm [https://perma.cc/L86V-TW8Q]
(last updated Sept. 27, 2019). See also McPherson, supra note 166, at
234–35, 271–74 (explaining South Carolina’s leading role in fomenting
secession and its reasons for striking preemptively on Fort Sumter).
169. The secession statement of South Carolina clarifies the role of slavery and
the profoundly anti-democratic nature of the rebel cause:
A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the
States north of that line have united in the election of a man to
the high office of President of the United States, whose opinions
and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the
administration of the common Government, because he has
declared that that “Government cannot endure permanently half
slave, half free,” and that the public mind must rest in the belief
that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction. This sectional
combination for the submersion of the Constitution, has been
aided in some of the States by elevating to citizenship, persons
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firing on Fort Sumter, the South failed to produce enough soldiers and
sufficient war materiel to successfully fight the industrial North.170
Atlanta burned, General Sherman marched to the sea, and General
Grant accepted General Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Courthouse.171
Arguably the South lost the war after Lee’s unsuccessful attacks upon
the Union Army at Gettysburg. 172 In any event, about 750,000 Amer–

who, by the supreme law of the land, are incapable of becoming
citizens; and their votes have been used to inaugurate a new
policy, hostile to the South, and destructive of its beliefs and
safety.
Confederate States of America—Declaration of the Immediate
Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina
from the Federal Union paras. 22–23 (Dec. 24, 1860), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp [https://perma.cc/
R6CL-RJVG]. Interestingly, in order to justify its secession, South
Carolina invoked “the equal rights of the States.” See id.; see also
McPherson, supra note 166, at 258 (noting that the Constitution of the
Confederate States expressly protected states’ sovereignty and required
states to protect slavery). The Confederate Constitution expressly forbade
the Confederate Congress from restricting slavery and restricted states’
abilities to interfere with slavery. Conf. Const. of Mar. 1861, art. I,
§9, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_csa.asp
[https://perma.cc/R6CL-RJVG]; id. art. IV, §§ 2, 3.
170. McPherson, supra note 166, at 854–59 (“The North had a potential
manpower superiority of more than three to one (counting only white
men) and Union armed forces had an actual superiority of two to one
during most of the war. In economic resources and logistical capacity the
northern advantage was even greater.”)
171. See generally id. at 752–56, 807–26, 848–50 (describing the Union and
Confederate descent on Atlanta, Sherman’s motive for his march to the
sea, and Grant’s invitation to Lee to surrender). The burning of Atlanta
and the March to the Sea imposed a new level of cruelty upon civilians.
In Atlanta, General Sherman ordered the citizens evacuated and the
Union Army burned the vast majority of buildings. See Phil Leigh, Who
Burned Atlanta?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2014), https://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2014/11/13/who-burned-atlanta/ [https://perma.cc/KU4FBSEH]. During the March to the Sea, Sherman’s troops pursued a “totalwar philosophy,” destroying anything of any military value and consuming
civilian food supplies with the intent of “making Georgia howl” and
undermining the South’s will to continue the war. McPherson, supra
note 166, at 808–11.
172. “The Battle of Gettysburg was a turning point in the Civil War, the
Union victory that ended General Robert E. Lee’s second and most
ambitious invasion of the North. Often referred to as the ‘High Water
Mark of the Rebellion’, Gettysburg was the Civil War’s bloodiest battle
and was also the inspiration for President Abraham Lincoln’s immortal
‘Gettysburg Address’.” A New Birth of Freedom, Nat’l Park Serv.,
https://www.nps.gov/gett/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/92HV-XUS5]
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ican deaths ultimately changed the nature of federalism: the South did
not retain sufficient “equal sovereignty” to secede against the wishes of
the federal government and the North imposed the abolition of
slavery. 173 These facts are removed from mechanisms like judicial review
or repeal and retain constitutional significance today. 174
Importantly, in the wake of the North’s triumph, the U.S.
Constitution evolved in a fundamentally democratic manner. 175 The
Fifteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation. 176

After the Civil War, former slaves could vote, 177 at least for a
time. 178 This certainly does not reflect the operation of any “equal
(last updated Oct. 2, 2019). See also Lepore, supra note 22, at 294
(describing the thousands of photographs taken of post-battle carnage).
173. New research indicates the Civil War resulted in more casualties than
previously estimated:
For 110 years, the numbers stood as gospel: 618,222 men died in
the Civil War, 360,222 from the North and 258,000 from the
South—by far the greatest toll of any war in American history.
But new research shows that the numbers were far too low. By
combing through newly digitized census data from the 19th
century, J. David Hacker, a demographic historian from
Binghamton University in New York, has recalculated the death
toll and increased it by more than 20 percent—to 750,000.
Guy Gugliotta, New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/civil-wartoll-up-by-20-percent-in-new-estimate.html [https://perma.cc/K7FD-JWJK].
174. See Lepore, supra note 22, at 293 (“The Civil War . . . was vast and
long, four brutal, wretched years of misery on a scale never before seen.”).
175. The states ratified the Fifteenth amendment in 1870. 15th Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution: Voting Rights (1870), Nat’l Archives, https://
www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=44 [https://perma.cc/
YGC4-A9ZG] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
176. U.S. Const. amend. XV.
177. The Supreme Court enforced the Fifteenth Amendment to prohibit
“grandfather tests” for voting rights. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915).
178. After the election of 1876, the Republicans withdrew their support from
Reconstruction efforts and the Democrats used violence and terrorism to
restore white supremacy. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American
Law § 2.8 (2008). See also Richard White, The Republic for Which
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sovereignty” and instead only occurred as a result of a protracted
violent struggle in which the South could not match the industrial
North. 179 Today, it defies history to circumscribe federal power and
democratically negotiated outcomes to restore antebellum 180 notions of
sovereignty and the slavocracy that spawned such notions. 181
The next major expansion of voting rights occurred in the
aftermath of World War I. World War I itself drew the U.S. in to “make
the world safe for democracy.” 182 In fact, President Wilson refused to
even negotiate with Germany so long as the Hohenzollern monarchy
remained; 183 he would only deal with democratic representatives of
It Stands 332 (2017) (stating that after the hotly disputed election of
1876, a compromise meant that “Hayes would not enforce the civil rights
laws in the South; he would not deploy federal troops”). “Political equality
had been possible, in the South, only at the barrel of a gun. As soon as
federal troops withdrew . . . [t]he Klan terrorized the countryside, burning
homes and hunting, torturing, and killing people.” Lepore, supra note
22, at 330.
179. McPherson, supra note 166, at 854–59.
180. In 1845, the Court held:
First, [t]he shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them,
were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but
were reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, [t]he new states
have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this
subject as the original states. Thirdly, [t]he right of the United
States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all
needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof,
conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in
controversy in this case.
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845).
181. See Boucher, supra note 166.
182. President Wilson stated our war aims to Congress:
The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be
planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have
no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We
seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for
the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the
champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when
those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom
of nations can make them.
President Woodrow Wilson, Joint Address to Congress Leading to a
Declaration of War Against Germany (Apr. 2, 1917), available at Woodrow
Wilson’s War Message, Digital History, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/
disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1406 [https://perma.cc/Y394-9GYE]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
183. A.C. Umbreit, The Peace Notes: The Armistice: The Surrender, 3 Marq.
L. Rev. 3, 5 (1918). At the conclusion of the war, much optimism
surrounded the opportunity to democratize the world:
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Germany. 184 This effectively ended the German monarchy and put
Germany on its (torturous) path towards the democratic governance it
enjoys today. 185 World War I therefore illustrates the core cultural value
of democracy in America, evinced by America’s increased dedication to
the cause by sending as much as 250,000 fresh U.S. troops to France
per month in 1918. 186 Ultimately, U.S. military might ended the most
durable monarchies in Europe, as the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollern
dynasties followed the Romanovs to extinction. 187
Back home, World War I profoundly remade America. “The long
fight to secure voting rights for women . . . reached its climax during
the war and largely because of it.” 188 Wilson decided in January 1918—
at the same time he urged self-determination and democracy
abroad 189—that he would change his previous opposition and support a
constitutional amendment to give women the right to vote. 190 Wilson
claimed that this would support the war effort; indeed, that it was “just
and necessary.” 191 On June 28, 1919, the warring powers signed the
[T]he task of teaching all these nations, large and small, the ways
of democracy, rests upon us alone, and if we should fail, then
democracy again will become a dream. While the war against
autocratic militarism is over, the contest to make democracy safe
and workable has but just begun.
Id. at 14. While monarchies vanished from the scene insofar as the great
powers were concerned, the horrors of militarism reemerged a scant
twenty years later with the onset of World War II.
184. Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace 36
(1944) (noting President Wilson’s refusal to deal with “the military
masters of the monarchial autocrats” and instead demanding
unconditional surrender if Kaiser Wilhelm remained in power).
185. Id. at 36–39. Wilson pursued democracy abroad for white Europeans, but
he pursued segregation at home and did nothing to resist Jim Crow laws.
See Jim Lehr, The Racist Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, Atlantic (Nov.
27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/wilsonlegacy-racism/417549/ [https://perma.cc/7E6Q-EQ9L].
186. G.J. Meyer, A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 677
(2006).
187. G.J. Meyer, The World Remade: America in World War I 470,
571 (2016).
188. Id. at 337.
189. Id. at 375 (recounting Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech to Congress to
justify the conscription and transit of three million U.S. troops to Europe).
190. Id. at 339, 343.
191. Id. at 343. World War I highlighted the contributions and sacrifices
women made to the war effort; and women’s voting rights raised the
possibility that full civic participation of women could avert the horrors
of war. As President Wilson stated to the Senate in support of a
constitutional amendment securing the vote for women: “I regard the
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Versailles Treaty ending both World War I and the plague of the
monarchies. 192 On June 4, 1919, Congress passed the Nineteenth
Amendment, which was ratified the following year. 193 It provides: “The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis–
lation.” 194 Once again, America paid in blood for expanded demo–
cracy. 195 Axiomatically, the Nineteenth Amendment doubled voting
rights in America. 196
The next great leap in voting rights occurred as a result of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. 197 “The veterans of World War II and the
Korean War became the foot soldiers of the civil rights movement in
the 1950s and 1960s.” 198 These foot soldiers marched in Selma, Alabama
for the right to vote, leading directly to passage of the VRA in August
1965. 199 Fighting for freedom in Europe and Asia led directly to the
concurrence of the Senate in the constitutional amendment proposing the
extension of the suffrage to women as vitally essential to the successful
prosecution of the great war of humanity in which we are engaged.”
President Woodrow Wilson, Equal Suffrage, Address of the President of
the United States to the Senate (Sept. 30, 1918), available at https://www.
senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/image/WilsonSpeech1918.htm
[https://perma.cc/XY4X-GQ3H].
192. Bailey, supra note 184, at 302.
193. 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women’s Right to Vote (1920),
Nat’l Archives, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&
doc=63 [https://perma.cc/9TDJ-HZWC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
194. U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
195. See Carol R. Byerly, War Losses (USA), Int’l Encyclopedia of
World War I, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_
losses_usa [https://perma.cc/CLF5-E53M] (last updated Jan. 8, 2017)
(“American losses in World War I were modest compared to those of other
belligerents, with 116,516 deaths and approximately 320,000 sick and
wounded of the 4.7 million men who served.”).
196. Lepore, supra note 22, at 402.
197. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 52 U.S.C.). The Act addressed the widespread failure of the
Fifteenth Amendment to successfully secure the voting rights of African
Americans and other minorities. Bell, supra note 178, §§ 6.1–6.7.
198. Maria Höhn, African-American GIs of WWII: Fighting for Democracy
Abroad and at Home, The Conversation (Feb. 9, 2017, 11:06 PM),
http://theconversation.com/african-american-gis-of-wwii-fighting-fordemocracy-abroad-and-at-home-71780 [https://perma.cc/UB9P-QT9L].
199. Lepore, supra note 22, at 620–23. The televised violence of Alabama
State Troopers “cracking the skulls” of non-violent protesters on the
Pettus Bridge moved President Lyndon Johnson and the nation to action.
Id. at 622.
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fight for civil rights at home. Over one million African Americans served
in World War II to protect the civil rights that they themselves were
not yet able to enjoy. 200 Many more also fought in Korea during the
Cold War. 201 Service in the war effort emboldened African American
resistance to continued white supremacy at home. 202 In the meantime,
the racist ideology of Nazi Germany fell into grave disrepute and the
Cold War created an imperative for the U.S. to stand for freedom not
just for whites but for people of all colors worldwide. 203
The VRA operated as the “most successful” 204 civil-rights act in
history for forty-seven years before Chief Justice Roberts articulated a
new-fangled theory of “equal sovereignty.” 205 As astute commentators
recognize:
The impact of the 1965 Act was immediate and dramatic. By
1968, more than one million new Black voters were registered, a
figure that included more than 50 percent of the Black voting-age
population in every southern state. The most dramatic immediate
change occurred in Alabama, where the percentage of Black
Americans registered to vote rose from 11 percent in 1956 to 51.2
percent in 1966.
Over the longer term, the Act delivered impressive (though not
perfect) results as the number of registered Black voters
continued to climb and the historic gaps between Black and
White registration rates narrowed. In addition, there was
significant growth in the number of Black elected officials. Most
200. Höhn, supra note 198.
201. Id.
202. James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations 19–31 (1997) (“World
War II seemed like a turning point in the nation’s quest for greater ethnic
acculturation and racial equality.”).
203. Keyssar, supra note 167, at 195–204 (tracing the impact of World War
II and the Cold War on minorities’ voting rights); Derrick Bell, Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 518, 524–25 (1980) (stating that “the decision helped to provide
immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to
win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples” and that
“Brown offered much needed reassurance to American blacks that the
precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during World War II might
yet be given meaning at home”).
204. “The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the most successful civil rights law in
the history of the United States.” Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin,
From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police
Reform, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 294 & n.196 (2017). In Mississippi,
African-American registration soared from ten percent to almost sixty
percent in four years from 1964 to 1968. Keyssar, supra note 167, at 212.
205. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013).
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notably, by the time the Supreme Court heard Shelby County v.
Holder, “African-American voter turnout ha[d] come to exceed
White voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by
Section 5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one half of
one percent.” 206

Scholars link the gains in African-Americans’ civil rights (including
voting rights) in the mid-1960s to their willingness to enlist in the
Vietnam War. 207 Clearly, the VRA formed the cornerstone of a longterm effort to grant basic civil rights to African Americans, and the
minority rule imposed to overturn it lacks any semblance of legitimacy
beyond raw political power buttressed by yesteryear’s slavocracy. 208
Like the expansion of voting rights generally, the next great
expansion of voting power occurred in the wake of a bloody conflict—
the Vietnam War. 209 The Twenty-sixth Amendment provides:
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation. 210

The Twenty-sixth Amendment was ratified by the states on July
1, 1971, 211 as the country found itself embroiled in a conflict that
necessitated transporting hundreds of thousands of young men to the
jungles of Southeast Asia. 212 As Dwight Eisenhower put it, the basic
206. Mazzone & Rushin, supra note 204, at 294 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
207. See Patterson, supra note 202, at 617; see also Daniel S. Lucks, Selma
to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War 133–
40 (2014) (linking disproportionate African-American enlistment to civilrights gains and the fact that military service fueled further advancement).
208. See sources cited supra notes 138, 160, 161, and 180.
209. Keyssar, supra note 167, at 226–28 (discussing the critical influence of
Vietnam, as well as the Cold War and World War II, on both the
enactment of the Twenty-sixth Amendment and in fueling a vast increase
in voting rights in the 1960s and 1970s).
210. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
211. See Historical Highlights: The 26th Amendment, U.S. House of
Representatives: History, Art & Archives, https://history.house.gov/
HistoricalHighlight/Detail/37022 [https://perma.cc/5EMB-PSJC] (last
visited Nov. 20, 2019).
212. By 1971, hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops had served in Vietnam.
Vietnam War Allied Troop Levels 1960–73, Am. War Libr. (Dec. 6,
2008), https://www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwatl.htm [https://
perma.cc/742Z-QKYF].
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argument in favor of expanded voting rights for youths came down to
this: “If a man is old enough to fight he is old enough to vote.” 213 Once
again, expanded voting rights occurred due to a war.
Amending the U.S. Constitution requires overwhelming political
consensus. 214 The Constitution has only been amended to expand voting
rights and democracy and, repeatedly, to empower Congress to protect
voting rights from denial or abridgement. 215 This expansion of voting
power is closely associated with the sacrifices of war—including sacri–
fices paid in blood. 216 At the constitutional level, this expansion of
democracy is a one-way street. 217 Thus, the value of securing democracy
cannot be overstated; it is a core American value vindicated generation
after generation. 218 This value should fuel hope and aggressive action to

213. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the
Right to Vote, 71 Cin. L. Rev. 1345, 1358–59 (2003). The plain meaning
of the Amendment prohibits all age discrimination denying or abridging
voting rights, a point we return to in the next part of the Article. See Eric
S. Fish, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 Yale L.
J. 1168, 1174–77 (2012).
214. U.S. Const. art. V.
215. See sources cited supra notes 176, 194, and 210.
216. As President Lyndon Johnson stated to a joint session of Congress in
1965:
This was the first nation in the history of the world to be founded
with a purpose. The great phrases of that purpose still sound in
every American heart, North and South: “All men are created
equal,” “government by consent of the governed,” “give me liberty
or give me death.” Well, those are not just clever words, or those
are not just empty theories. In their name Americans have fought
and died for two centuries, and tonight around the world they
stand there as guardians of our liberty, risking their lives.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on
Voting Legislation (Mar. 15, 1965), available at American Rhetoric: Top
100 Speeches, Am. Rhetoric https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
lbjweshallovercome.htm [https://perma.cc/XD2D-LBWZ] (last updated
May 22, 2018). “[T]he most prominent peaks in the history of the franchise
in the United States were the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World
Wars I and II, and the first decades of the cold war. Each of these conflicts
contributed significantly to the broadening of the right to vote.”
Keyssar, supra note 167, at 296.
217. No constitutional amendment has ever circumscribed voting or citizens’
democratic voice. See generally U.S. Const.
218. Keyssar, supra note 167, at xix (“According to our national self-image—
an image etched in popular culture and buttressed by scholarly inquiry—
the United States has been the pioneer of republican and then democratic
reforms for two hundred years, the standard bearer of democratic values
on the stage of world history.”).
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defeat the stealth efforts to reimpose an American oligarchy by all
means necessary under the law.
Recently, hope has emerged from Florida. On November 6, 2018,
the citizens of Florida voted to pass the Voting Restoration
Amendment (“Amendment 4”), a measure that held favor with sixtyfive percent of voters. 219 Amendment 4, as it stands, restores voting
rights to over 1.4 million convicted felons—the largest voter expansion
since the Twenty-sixth Amendment. 220 The terms of Amendment 4
restore voting rights to convicted felons who have “completed their
prison term, parole and probation, except those with murder or felony
sexual-assault convictions.” 221 While some backtracking may occur, the
fact remains that a powerful majority of a large, diverse, and critical
swing state voted to expand democracy. 222
Felony enfranchisement could well create the next great expansion
in voter eligibility. The vote in Florida mirrors nationwide support for
halting felony disenfranchisement. 223 Felony disenfranchisement
disproportionately affects African Americans, as intended in the postCivil War South where many such laws find their roots. 224 Currently,
219. Jessica Weiss, When Will Amendment 4 Be Implemented?, WRLN (Dec. 14,
2018), https://www.wlrn.org/post/when-will-amendment-4-be-implemented
[https://perma.cc/JM6Y-9GDD].
220. Jon Kamp & Arian Campo-Flores, Florida to Gain 1.4 Million Voters if
Felon Measure Passes, Wall St. J. (Oct. 30, 2018, 5:42 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/florida-to-gain-1-4-million-voters-if-felon-measurepasses-1540891801 [https://perma.cc/26Z3-4CD3].
221. Id.
222. Lawrence Mower, Paying Restitution Fully Is a Huge Complication for
the Intent of Amendment 4, Miami Herald (Apr. 4, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/
article228821704.html [https://perma.cc/2ALT-Z2WH] (“Republican
lawmakers and some key supporters of Amendment 4 believe sentences
include restitution. Others disagree.”). The GOP will continue its war on
democracy by all means necessary with respect to all expansions of voting
rights, particularly voting rights for people of color, which plays a key role
in justifying legal counterattacks. See David Leonhardt, G.O.P. vs. Voting
Rights (Yes, Again), N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/09/opinion/florida-felons-vote-amendment-4.html [https://perma.
cc/Z3LU-RB2W].
223. Sam Levine & Ariel Edwards-Levy, Most Americans Favor Restoring
Felons’ Voting Rights, But Disagree On How, Huffington Post (Mar.
21, 2018, 6:56 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/felons-voting-rightspoll_n_5ab2c153e4b008c9e5f3c88a [https://perma.cc/2ALT-Z2WH].
224. Id.; see also Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace
of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in
the United States, 1850-2002, 109 Am. J. Soc. 559, 598 (2003) (finding
that after the Civil War “felon disenfranchisement laws offered one
method for states to avert ‘the menace of negro domination.’”).
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about 6.1 million felons cannot vote due to felony disenfranchisement
laws across the U.S. 225 This defies the general trend of American history,
shown above, toward greater franchise rights. 226 In fact, in 1788, less
than two percent of the population voted for president. 227 Today, about
forty or forty-five percent of the population votes for president. 228 The
percentage of Americans voting for president has increased by a factor
of twenty since the incipiency of our republic. 229
That is the central point here. The constitutional trajectory of
democratic governance moves only in the direction of greater majority
rule, despite its admittedly oligarchic beginning. 230 The core value of
ever-increasing democracy arises very often either from a contract with
those asked to make the ultimate sacrifice in wartime or from the
consecration of war. 231 Indeed, the U.S. traditionally operated as an
225. Karin Kamp, Voting By the Numbers: Americans and Election Day,
Moyers & Company (Nov. 8, 2016), https://billmoyers.com/story/
numbers-americans-election-day-voting/ [https://perma.cc/T3FU-UBJK].
According to one observer, the major spikes in voting rights arose from
the earliest decades of the republic:
As different segments of the American population gained the right
to vote throughout our history, the percentage of voters as
compared to population increased. The first surge came in 1828,
when non-property-owning white men gained the right to vote.
Then we see another surge, when women got the right to vote in
1920.
Id.
226. See supra Part IV.
227. Kamp, supra note 225.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See generally Keyssar, supra note 167 at 295–98 (tracing the expansion
of voting rights throughout U.S. history).
231. As Professor Karlan explains:
[T]he history of voting rights in America has been an admirable
one. Far from being “almost bloodless, almost completely peaceful,
and astonishingly easy,” the struggle for voting rights has in fact
been none of those things. The most significant developments—
from the enactment of the Reconstruction, Nineteenth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the abandonment of wealth
qualifications—were either directly or indirectly the product of
wars. Sometimes, war has emboldened previously excluded groups
to demand their right to full citizenship; sometimes, war has
brought home to the rest of the nation the injustice of asking
people to fight on behalf of a government that excludes them. As
much as our military engagements have focused on making the
rest of world safe for democracy, they have often been as valuable
in helping to achieve democracy at home.
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international force for democracy as a means of stabilizing the global
political order and securing peace. 232 Moreover, democratic rule forms
an essential element of the rule of law233 and should certainly warrant
protection as a fundamental right under American law. 234 Consequently,
based upon these realities, we advocate that the law restructure our
electoral processes to maximize democratic influence by all means
necessary. 235 The next section expands on the meaning of that term for
purposes of our democracy in the current era.

IV. Reforming Democracy
Congress holds the power to regulate and restructure our
democracy. For example, Article I, section 4 of the Constitution
provides: “Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
Karlan, supra note 213, at 1371 (footnotes omitted).
232. Larry Diamond, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage,
Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency 41–43 (2019).
Unfortunately, the “steady decline in the quality of American democracy”
contributed to a decline of democratic freedom worldwide after 2006, in
favor of a more autocratic vision of governance proffered by China and
Russia, “which are avidly undermining democratic and liberal values
around the world.” Larry Diamond, The Global Crisis of Democracy,
Wall St. J. (May 18, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-global-crisis-of-democracy-11558105463 [https://perma.cc/C47K-PL7D].
233. See sources cited supra note 162.
234. Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18
Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 143, 176–86 (2008). Douglas summarizes
as follows:
Most Americans believe that they have a voice in their democracy
because they can exercise that right. Every four years, advocacy
groups urge citizens to vote in that year’s presidential election.
We fight wars overseas in part to help people in foreign countries
achieve the freedom that comes with the ability to cast a ballot.
In short, the right to vote is part of our ethos for what it means
to be an American. The problem, however, is that our legal system
has not always given an individual’s right to vote the same
venerated status as it has given many other important rights.
Although the right to vote is considered a “fundamental” right,
courts often treat the right to vote as less than fundamental by
employing a low level of scrutiny to election law challenges.
Id. at 145 (footnotes omitted).
235. Americans will generally support all such efforts. About fifty-five percent
believe our democracy is “weak” and sixty-eight percent think it is
“weakening.” Democracy Project, supra note 6, at 4–5. Moreover, sixty
percent of Americans rate democracy as “absolutely important” and an
additional seventeen percent rate it as “very important.” Id. at 3.
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thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” 236 In Arizona
v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 237 the Court read congressional
authority under the Elections Clause broadly, explaining that:
Because the power the Elections Clause confers is none other than
the power to pre-empt, the reasonable assumption is that the
statutory text accurately communicates the scope of Congress’s
pre-emptive intent. Moreover, the federalism concerns underlying
the presumption in the Supremacy Clause context are somewhat
weaker here. Unlike the States’ “historic police powers,” the
States’ role in regulating congressional elections—while weighty
and worthy of respect—has always existed subject to the express
qualification that it “terminates according to federal law.” In sum,
there is no compelling reason not to read Elections Clause
legislation simply to mean what it says. 238

The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for
the direct, popular election of Senators instead of their selection by
state legislatures, rendered moot the one limitation on Congress’s power
under the Elections Clause; that is, when it comes to elections for both
houses of Congress, Congress has broad power to regulate those
elections. 239
Congress enjoys additional power under multiple other
constitutional provisions relating to elections. 240 Most importantly, the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments each
empowers Congress to enforce the expanded franchise rights those
Amendments provide and to protect such voting rights from being
“denied or abridged.” 241 Because of the overlapping and multiple grants
of authority to Congress to secure federal elections, scholars posit that
“federal power is at its highest ebb when Congress seeks to regulate
federal elections.” 242 Further, “federalism is not a barrier to aggressive

236. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
237. 570 U.S. 1 (2013).
238. Id. at 14–15 (citations omitted) (first quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); then quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)).
239. Id. at 16–17; see also U.S. Const. amend. XVII (changing the place of
Senate selections away from State legislatures).
240. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 4–5; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. IV, § 4; id.
amends. XXII, XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI.
241. Id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX; id. amend.
XXVI, § 2.
242. Tolson, supra note 144, at 322. Professor Tolson continues:
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federal action under the Elections Clause seeking to protect the
fundamental right to vote” because these Amendments commit the
federal government to guard the expanded democracy that the
Amendments envision. 243
Congress should use this power to immediately reverse felony
disenfranchisement nationwide. Scholars find the laws closely associated
with the maintenance of racial hierarchy:
The expansion of citizenship to racial minorities, and the
subsequent extension of suffrage to all citizens, threatened to
undermine the political power of the white majority. By
restricting the voting rights of a disproportionately nonwhite
population, felon disenfranchisement laws offered one method for
states to avert “the menace of negro domination.” The sharp
increase in African-American imprisonment goes hand-in-hand
with changes in voting laws. In many Southern states, the
percentage of nonwhite prison inmates nearly doubled between
1850 and 1870. Whereas 2% of the Alabama prison population
was nonwhite in 1850, 74% was nonwhite in 1870, though the
total nonwhite population increased by only 3%. Felon
disenfranchisement provisions offered a tangible response to the
threat of new African-American voters that would help preserve
existing racial hierarchies. 244

Reversing felony-disenfranchisement laws would not violate any
new legal doctrines like “equal sovereignty” because the laws would not
be limited to the South. 245 Indeed, it is challenging to find nonFrom this perspective, the sin of Shelby County is not only the
neutering of a significant provision of one of the most successful
civil rights statutes in history, but also that it leaves a legacy of
constitutional interpretation ignorant of the full spectrum of
congressional authority in this area. The Court focused on the
substantial federalism costs of the VRA, ignoring that the Act
arguably could have been sustained based on some combination
of the Elections Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
Id. at 323 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 6 (1965) (“The bill, as
amended, is designed primarily to enforce the 15th amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and is also designed to enforce the 14th
amendment and article I, section 4.”)).
243. Id. at 321–22.
244. Behrens et al., supra note 224, at 598 (citations omitted).
245. Id. (“As in the South, new Western states struggled to sustain control
‘under conditions of full democratization’ and a changing industrial and
agricultural economy. Racial and ethnic divisions thus led to similar
attempts to limit suffrage of the non-white population . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
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discriminatory reasons for these laws. 246 The fact that these laws mimic
the operation of the “three-fifths a man” rule compounds the laws’
odiousness because ineligible prisoners inflate the voting power of rural
districts where prisons are typically found while denying those prisoners
the right to vote. 247 Repeal of all felony disenfranchisement rests clearly
within the powers of Congress to protect voting rights and democracy.
Another means of expanding democracy to meet the threat of an
oligarchy entails granting statehood to Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia. The Constitution grants this power to Congress. 248 It is
impossible to defend the non-voting status of the U.S. citizens currently
residing in Puerto Rico. 249 This summarizes the bizarre status of our cocitizens in Puerto Rico:
Though Puerto Rico nationals are U.S. citizens and they send a
non-voting resident commissioner to the U.S. House of Represen–
tatives, they are prohibited from voting in presidential elections.

246. Id. (“Our results suggest that one of the reasons that felon
disenfranchisement laws persist may be their compatibility with modern
racial ideologies. The laws are race neutral on their face, though their
origins are tainted by strategies of racial containment.”); see also Hunter
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1981) (holding that Alabama’s constitutional
provision disenfranchising felons violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
247. As one practitioner notes:
In forty-four states, prisoners are treated as residents of their
prison cell for the purposes of creating electoral districts, although
they themselves cannot vote, and are likely to return to their home
community after serving their term of incarceration. Those sent
to prison are disproportionately people of color and disproport–
ionately come from urban areas. Prisons, however, are increasingly
located in more rural areas, among disproportionately white, more
conservative populations.
Julie A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison
Gerrymandering and the Dilution of Prisoners’ Political Representation,
45 Fordham Urb. L.J. 323, 371 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
248. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction
of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).
249. Colonial rule of U.S. citizens can only be termed “a historic injustice,”
starkly inconsistent with the nation’s history of expanding democracy. See
Camilo Montoua-Galvez & David Begnaud, Lawmakers Introduce Puerto
Rico Statehood Bill: “It’s Time to End 120 Years of Colonialism,” CBS News
(Mar. 28, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/statehoodfor-puerto-rico-lawmakers-to-introduce-bill-granting-puerto-rico-statehoodbypassing-any-referendum/ [https://perma.cc/7BAU-TTA4].
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However, Puerto Rican nationals can cast ballots in the Democ–
ratic and Republican nominating contests for the White House. 250

The current policy of colonial rule in Puerto Rico leaves 3.2 million
Americans disenfranchised. 251 With respect to the District of Colombia,
the Washington Post states, bluntly:
Another bill . . . has been introduced . . . that would make D.C.
the nation’s 51st state . . . . It is wrong that the more than 700,000
people who live in the District, paying taxes and fulfilling all the
other obligations of citizenship (including going to war), are
denied a voice in Congress. It is time for them to be heard. 252

In all, four million U.S. citizens simply do not count in American
democracy because they happen to live in Washington, D.C., or Puerto
Rico. 253
Reforming the Senate itself presents more difficulty. 254 After all,
Article V specifies that “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate” through any constitutional
amendment. 255 The current system deprives both states and individuals
of any notion of “equal suffrage” in the Senate: “today a voter in the
state with the lowest population—Wyoming, with 573,000 people—has
250. Amanda Becker, Puerto Rico Governor says 2020 Democrats Must
Support Statehood, Reuters (Feb. 22, 2019, 2:14 PM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-election-puertorico/puerto-rico-governor-says-2020democrats-must-support-statehood-idUSKCN1QB2A4
[https://perma.cc/9WYN-WS3F].
251. See Montoua-Galvez & Begnaud, supra note 249; see also José A.
Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 450, 461 (1986) (reviewing Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme
Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal
(1985) (“Puerto Rico is still not a part of the ‘United States’ for all
constitutional purposes; the island and its people are still subject to the
laws and regulations adopted by the political branches of the national
government before which they appear only as supplicants . . . .”)).
252. The House Finally Voted to Support D.C. Statehood. It’s a Needed Step.,
Wash. Post (Mar. 12, 2019, 7:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/the-house-finally-voted-to-support-dc-statehood-its-a-needed-step/
2019/03/12/f171771c-4434-11e9-8aab-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html?utm_term=
.d46d72b134b7 [https://perma.cc/7DFF-SPPD].
253. In both Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, strong citizen
majorities favor statehood. See Mehdi Hasan, Eight Simple Steps to Fix
American Democracy, NewStatesmanAmerica (Nov. 1, 2019), https://
www.newstatesman.com/world/north-america/2018/11/eight-simple-stepsfix-american-democracy [https://perma.cc/46SF-Z3QM].
254. If the Senate can become more democratically constituted then the
electoral college will follow. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
255. U.S. Const. art. V.
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approximately 70 times the influence in the Senate as a voter in the
largest state, California, where the population is 39.5 million.” 256 This
plainly abridges and dilutes the votes of women and minorities in highly
populated states. 257 The political scientist David Birdsell calculates that
by 2040, seventy percent of U.S. citizens will reside in fifteen states
with thirty Senators; on the other hand, thirty percent of the population
will reside in thirty-five states with seventy Senators. 258
Professor Eric Orts argues that Congress holds the power to alter
the current convention of limiting states to two senators. 259 He finds
this power in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and
Twenty-sixth Amendments, which he argues give Congress broad power
to protect voting rights from being “denied or abridged.” 260 The
Constitution requires only that the Senate “be composed” 261 of two
senators per state; if the Senate also consisted of an overlay of
proportional representation based upon population, as Orts suggests,
the Constitution as a whole would be harmonized in a pro-democracy
direction. 262 We argue, in short, that the Senate “be composed” of two
Senators per state, and be further composed of additional Senators
based upon state population to vindicate every State’s right to equal
suffrage in the senate.

256. Stephen Mihm, Why Power in the Senate Is Increasingly Imbalanced,
Bloomberg (Feb. 8, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2019-02-08/senate-power-imbalance-tilts-toward-least-populousstates [https://perma.cc/GB88-GBWA].
257. See Philip Bump, By 2040, Two-thirds of Americans Will Be Represented
by 30 Percent of the Senate, Wash. Post (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:23 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/28/by-2040two-thirds-of-americans-will-be-represented-by-30-percent-of-the-senate/?utm
_term=.81010530283f [https://perma.cc/BD48-V3PR] (“Population
projections from the University of Virginia’s Weldon Cooper Center for
Public Service offer a slightly lower distribution: By 2040, the 15 most
populous states will be home to 67 percent of the U.S. population and
represented by 30 percent of the Senate.”).
258. Id.
259. Eric W. Orts, The Path to Give California 12 Senators, and Vermont Just
One, Atlantic (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2019/01/heres-how-fix-senate/579172/ [https://perma.cc/A2MG-TZQC].
260. Id.
261. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3.
262. Much turns on the meaning of the word composed. See, e.g., Compose,
Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 419 (1996)
(defining “compose” primarily to mean “to make or form by combining
things or parts.”); Compose, Random House Dictionary of the
English Language 302 (unabridged ed. 1973) (“to make or form by
combining things, parts or elements”).
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Congress should also exercise its power to render the Supreme
Court more responsive to democratic realities and to check abusive uses
of judicial review. 263 Few would dispute that judicial review protects
individual rights when the Court exercises judicial review on behalf of
minorities to prevent a tyranny of the majority. 264 But exercising
judicial review for the reinstallation of an oligarchy composed of the
already powerful lacks all legitimacy. 265 Protecting monied interests and
suspect socio-economic hierarchies, as the Court does today with
unblinking consistency, 266 profoundly distorts our democracy. 267 The
fact that only nine justices sit on the Court hailing from just two socalled “elite” law schools also makes the Court non-reflective of the

263. While judicial independence plays a crucial role in a well-ordered scheme
of democracy, the judiciary can overstep its bounds, and throughout our
history the government’s more political branches generally adhered to
extra-constitutional conventions to secure judicial independence or,
alternatively, to check perceived judicial excesses. See Tara Leigh Grove,
The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev.
465, 544–45 (2018).
264. See Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 24, at 673 (quoting United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“The idea of equal
protection of the laws is central to our modern understanding of the
Constitution. Today we generally think of equal protection as a
constitutional provision aimed against laws that injure groups defined by
race and sex and other ‘discrete and insular minorities.’”).
265. See Aaron Tang, Rethinking Political Power in Judicial Review, 106 Cal.
L. Rev. 1755, 1767–68 (2018); id. at 1825 (arguing “that legislative
enactments burdening politically powerful groups hold a special kind of
democratic and institutional pedigree that courts should take into
account”).
266. The Roberts Court holds a long record of empowering the powerful to the
point of nearly re-imposing an oligarchy through judicial fiat. See Janus
v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. and Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018)
(holding that labor unions may not collect fees to support political
activities); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 226
(2014) (lifting aggregate limits on campaign contributions); Shelby Cty.
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (holding pre-clearance provisions
of Voting Rights Act unconstitutional); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (allowing unlimited corporate
electioneering); see also Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court Protects the
Powerful for a New Gilded Age, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/opinion/sunday/supreme-court-kennedyroberts.html [https://perma.cc/X49G-3B44] (“When it comes to economic
inequality, today’s Supreme Court is not only failing to help but is also
aggressively making itself part of the problem in a time when inequality
and insecurity are damaging the country and endangering our democracy.”).
267. See Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 24, at 696 (advocating for strict
scrutiny against laws fostering an oligarchy and a strong presumption of
constitutionality for laws breaking-down oligarchy).
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nation and insensitive to the nation’s intellectual diversity. 268 This kind
of concentrated hyper-elitism finds fertile ground for the re-imposition
of an oligarchy under the guise of a “meritocracy.” Over the years, the
Court has ranged in size from five justices to ten. 269 In the early decades
of the Republic, the number of justices increased as the nation expan–
ded. 270 It has remained fixed at nine since 1869. 271 Meanwhile, our
population increased ten-fold. 272 Congress can and should insist on a
larger, more diverse Court. Expanding the Court makes sense as a
means of assuring that the vast diversity of the nation is adequately

268. Margaret Talev, Does Supreme Court’s Harvard-Yale Dominance Bother
Obama?, McClatchy (Apr. 12, 2010, 5:27 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc
.com/news/politics-government/article24579943.html [https://perma.cc/
UB9N-2KWE] (noting that George Washington University Professor
Jonathan Turley calls Harvard and Yale’s dominance on the Court
“perfectly absurd” and “remarkably inbred”); see also Jason Iuliano &
Avery Stewart, The New Diversity Crisis in the Federal Judiciary, 84
Tenn. L. Rev. 247, 299 (“Drawing upon the Federal Judicial Center
Biographical Database, we found that the educational diversity of federal
judges is at an all-time low. Over the past century, a smaller and smaller
number of law schools have claimed a larger and larger share of judgeships
and clerkships.”).
269. Peter G. Fish, Justices, Number of, The Oxford Companion to the
Supreme Court of the United States 550, 550 (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
2d ed. 2005).
270. Id.
271. The Judiciary Act of 1869 established the current nine-member Supreme
Court. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. Prior to that Act,
Congress regularly tinkered with the size of the Court. See Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (establishing that the Court “consist of
a chief justice and five associate justices”); Seventh Circuit Act of 1807,
ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421 (increasing the number from six to seven);
Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794 (setting the size
of the Court at one Chief Justice and nine Associate Justices). In 1866,
Congress decreased the number of justices. Judicial Circuits Act of 1866,
ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (“[N]o vacancy in the office of associate
justice of the [S]upreme [C]ourt shall be filled by appointment until the
number of associate justices shall be reduced to six.”).
272. See History: POP Culture: 1870, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www
.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1870_fast_f
acts.html [https://perma.cc/RF79-N85Y] (last revised Oct. 21, 2019)
(noting that the 1870 U.S. Census reported 38,558,371 U.S. residents); see
also Census Bureau Projects U.S. and World Populations on New Year’s
Day, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/2019/new-years-population.html [https://perma.cc/
ZPR4-T4KS] (“As our nation prepares to ring in the new year, the U.S.
Census Bureau projects the U.S. population will be 328,231,337 on Jan.
1, 2019.”).
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represented on the Court. 273 Such an expansion need not raise the
specter of a power-grab, like that which the GOP pulled off to achieve
minority rule. 274
Perhaps the most ambitious of the current proposals to help reverse
engineer the damage being done to our democracy is the “For the
People Act of 2019” 275 (also known as “HR 1”) which recently passed
the House of Representatives. 276 Sponsored by Representative Sarbanes
of Maryland, the Act’s goal is “to expand American’s access to the
ballot box, reduce the influence of big money in politics, and [to] streng–
then ethics rules for public servants and for other purposes.” 277 The
legislation passed the House in a party-line vote. 278 Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell stated that he would not even allow the GOPcontrolled Senate to vote on the measure. 279 The bill includes many bold
innovations such as federally funded campaign contributions that give
273. See Frey, supra note 16 (“Minorities will be the source of all of the growth
in the nation’s youth and working age population, most of the growth in
its voters, and much of the growth in its consumers and tax base as far
into the future as we can see.”).
274. On this point, President Franklin Roosevelt’s plan to expand the Court
is tainted to some degree:
Every history of America in the twentieth century recounts the
familiar chronicle—that in February of 1937, FDR, in response to
a series of decisions striking down New Deal laws, asked Congress
for authority to add as many as six Justices to the Supreme Court,
only to be outwitted by the Court itself when Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes demonstrated that Roosevelt’s claim that
the Court was not abreast of its docket was spurious; when the
conservative Justice Willis Van Devanter retired, thereby giving
the President an opportunity to alter the composition of the
bench; and when, above all, the Court, in a series of dramatic
decisions in the spring of 1937, abandoned its restricted
conception of the scope of the powers of both state and national
governments. In short, it is said, Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan
went down to defeat because, in the catchphrase that swept
Washington that spring, “a switch in time saved nine.”
William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A
Second Death, 1985 Duke L.J. 673, 673 (1985).
275. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Mike DeBonis & John Wagner, House Democrats Pass H.R. 1, Their
Answer to Draining the Swamp, Wash. Post (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-democrats-prepare-to-pass-hr1-their-answer-to-draining-the-swamp/2019/03/08/740f6b48-415b-11e99361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html?utm_term=.7b3b1257d27a [https://perma
.cc/SJA9-JS9B].
279. Id.
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a candidate six dollars for every one dollar they raise from small
donors. 280 On the other hand, it takes a more tepid approach toward
expanding voting power relative to the proposals above. 281
There are, in fact, many proposals for reforming and restricting our
democracy through law in ways that enhance the political system’s
ability to translate political pressure into law. 282 Senator Elizabeth
Warren favors abolishing the Electoral College. 283 Others favor
proportional representation in the Electoral College. 284 Another out–
standing proposal would institute an end-run around the Electoral
College without formally amending the Constitution by having states
that represent a majority of electoral votes (currently 270) enter into a
compact to cast all their electoral votes to the winner of the national
popular vote. 285 Many commentators also offer various methods to deal
with the anti-democratic nature of the U.S. Senate. 286
This Article does not address fully the constitutionality of any of
the above proposals for expanding democracy. Instead, it introduces a
compelling constitutional value—democracy and its expansion—as a
core cultural and historical value worthy of great weight. 287 It further
argues that given our history of expanding democracy, the tendency to
expand should weigh much more heavily than efforts to impose
oligarchic rule in judicial decisions. 288 The above proposals would be
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Calls for Ending Electoral College,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/us/
politics/elizabeth-warren-town-hall-electoral-college.html [https://perma
.cc/TD8X-HDMC].
284. Nicholas Riccardi, 2020 Democrats’ New Litmus Test: Abolish Electoral
College, U.S. News (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/
politics/articles/2019-03-20/2020-democrats-new-litmus-test-abolishelectoral-college [https://perma.cc/8NJE-UGZP].
285. National Popular Vote, Nat’l Conf. on State Legislatures (May 31,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/nationalpopular-vote.aspx [https://perma.cc/AY3W-4U3K].
286. See Orts, supra note 259 (“Today the voting power of a citizen in
Wyoming, the smallest state in terms of population, is about 67 times
that of a citizen in the largest state of California, and the disparities
among the states are only increasing. The situation is untenable.”); id.
(noting that scholars have suggested breaking up larger states, reforming
the Senate’s composition, or abolishing the Senate altogether).
287. Supra Part III.
288. Michele E. Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court
Contributes to Economic Inequality, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 389, 434 (“As
this [article] explains, the Supreme Court has directed political outcomes,
dismantled congressional attempts to rein in corporate political spending,
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consistent with that value, and they are appropriate means of repairing
our democracy and protecting our nation from the threat of an
oligarchy. 289 In other words, the constitutionality of efforts to expand
democracy should also consider the legitimacy and transparency of the
radical-right’s cause to re-impose oligarchy. 290 Constitutional decisionmaking does not occur by accident. 291 The handiwork of the Roberts
Court cannot find shelter behind any traditional mode of adjud–
ication. 292 The transparent repair and expansion of our democracy in
response to threat of an oligarchy would be furthered by the above
proposals.
In considering the validity of measures intended to restore
democracy, the intimate relationship between our racial history and
democracy must also weigh heavily. 293 At its birth, our nation
succumbed to continuing the nation’s racist stain—slavery—rather
than risk democracy. 294 Even after the bloody conflict of the Civil War
and the promise of the post-Civil War Amendments, white supremacists
and undermined the electoral process for low-income voters. In each of
these areas, the 1% flourishes, while the 99% becomes increasingly
disenfranchised.”).
289. Supra Part II.
290. E.g., Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on
Democracy, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1007, 1016 (2011) (“What increasingly
emerges from the Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions, like a
mountain appearing through the receding mists, is a foundational
conclusion that the United States Constitution, ultimately, secures a
power for people of wealth to use their disproportionate economic
resources to get their way in our politics.”).
291. See id. at 1009 (“[S]ave us from these . . . judges who ‘just call balls and
strikes.’ Plenty has been said about this grotesque hypocrisy. . . . My
favorite fusillade . . . is Senator Arlen Specter’s claim in his farewell
address that Chief Justice ‘Roberts promised to just call the balls and
strikes and then moved the bases.’”).
292. See id. at 1017 (“[The Roberts Court’s] decisions say, at bottom, that
there is something about our Constitution that means we are flatly
powerless to deal with the scourge of purchased politics. This cannot be
so. It is dangerous and demeaning to the world’s strongest democracy to
suggest that it is.”).
293. Thus, for example, the constitutional convention eschewed democracy in
favor of maintaining slavery. See Perea, Echoes, supra note 18, at 1087
(“Why does the world’s leading democracy rely on an electoral institution
that overrides the results of democracy? The answer to this question can
be found in the proslavery provisions of the Constitution.”).
294. Id. at 1087 (“As described earlier, the ‘three-fifths of all other persons’
phrase in the apportionment clause was intended to give additional
representation in Congress to the slave states. The electoral college also
was created to protect the political interests of slave owners in presidential
elections.”).
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and oligarchists needed racial animus to fuel their ascendancy and
economic domination in the South. 295 Today’s oligarchs continue to use
race to fuel their political ambitions to consolidate more power in fewer
hands. 296 Racial politics will bedevil our nation until we reckon with our
racial hierarchy. 297 Expanded democracy operates as a condition
precedent for breaking down our nation’s festering racial hierarchy.298
Resisting the continuation of racial politics also operates as a condition
precedent to expanded democracy. 299 Consequently, the stakes of
democracy and deracialization together form a compelling state
interest.
Regardless of the perceived conventions or norms at stake, those in
favor of a democracy over an oligarchy must not impede the vitality of
their cause by adhering to notions of precedent and constitutionality
that the radical right clearly rejects in their pursuit of a restored
oligarchy. 300 Justice Roberts and the other conservatives redefined the
nearly absolute political pliability of the term constitutionality in cases
like Citizens United and Shelby County. 301 They also defined the
importance of precedent in common-law rulemaking at the Supreme
Court level. 302 Judicial activism in pursuit of oligarchy knows few
bounds in the Roberts Court era. 303 Politicizing the role of the Senate
in voiding presidential appointment power also redefined the limits of
legislative power for partisan purposes. 304
295. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 21–25 (detailing Virginia’s oligarchy at
work under Harry Byrd).
296. Id. at 234.
297. Haney López, supra note 48, at 211.
298. Id. at 219–20.
299. Id. at 218–19.
300. Supra note 119.
301. Supra notes 95, 96, 105, 123.
302. Supra notes 97, 101.
303. E.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Unfit for Democracy: The Roberts
Court and the Breakdown of American Politics 203 (2016) (finding
that Roberts Court protects “entrenched political power” and does not
respect “rights to vote”); Robert Reich, The Most Brazen Invitation to
Oligarchy in Supreme Court History, Berkeley Blog (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2014/04/02/robert-reich-the-most-brazeninvitation-to-oligarchy-in-supreme-court-history/ [https://perma.cc/LP7CLE29] (“Overturning 40 years of national policy and 38 years of judicial
precedent, the Court’s decision allows federal officeholders to solicit and
individual donors to pour as much as $3.6 million directly into federal
campaigns every election cycle—buying unparalleled personal influence in
Washington . . . .”).
304. Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It
Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/
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On the other hand, our cause is democracy. The vindication of that
core value in opposition to stealthy efforts for a restored oligarchy
drives the analysis herein. 305 Properly valuing an expanding democracy
in accordance with U.S. history and cultural traditions opens far more
opportunities for legally restoring democracy. 306 The transparent
pursuit of democratic expansion under the law should operate to justify
even heretofore off-limits legal innovations and to tip constitutional
analysis more favorably toward traditional notions of democracy and
against the restoration of an oligarchy. 307 The threat of an oligarchy,
the core value of democracy, and the possibility of deracialization
combine to form a compelling interest of the highest gravity.

Conclusion
This Article argues for a representative democracy, cabined in
accordance with traditional republican and constitutional limitations,
but free of the archaic protections of slavery and fully reflective of the
historic bargains of expanded voting rights throughout our history. It
seeks to light the way for those wishing to challenge the radical right’s
efforts to transform our democracy into an oligarchy and to use race to
illegitimately entrench themselves at the apex of our political and
economic system contrary to any notion of democracy. Aggressively
pursuing democratic-enhancing legislative action will prove the most
efficacious method of short-circuiting the right’s success because of the
strength and history behind the core value of democracy in America.
The great majority of American voters remain committed to democracy
and voting rights; they understand the hard-fought gains in democracy
illustrated throughout our history. This value finds support in deep
historic and cultural roots. Most recently, the value of democracy
triumphed in Florida with the success of Amendment 4. It proved the
bipartisan appeal of democracy in the voting booth.
06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-whyit-matters-now [https://perma.cc/CAX3-2AJS] (“Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell declared any appointment by the sitting president to be
null and void.”).
305. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 151–53, 234; Mayer, supra note 47, at
376.
306. According to Professor MacLean, the pursuit of an oligarchy relies upon
both stealth and intimidation. MacLean, supra note 30, at 232–33
(detailing Koch-funded operatives’ secretive surveillance and intimidation
efforts).
307. As such, the proposals above operate within the current constitutional
framework rather than advocating for any amendments, as others suggest.
E.g., Devan Cole, Democratic Senator Introduces Constitutional Amendment
to Abolish Electoral College, CNN (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/
04/02/politics/senate-democrats-electoral-college-constitutional-amendment/
index.html [https://perma.cc/TJW9-J8VD].
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Viewed from this perspective, the effort to remedy the manifest
deficiencies in our democracy—an effort reflected in HR 1—may well
prove politically expedient as well as morally sound. Indeed, our
assessment suggests that the opposition to power consolidation should
relentlessly pursue enhanced democratic voting power wherever
possible. The opposition to the radical right should expose its antidemocratic agenda at every opportunity. It should also seek to highlight
the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of our political system
manifested in our institutions. The basis of the Electoral College and
the U.S. Senate in the South’s insatiable need to preserve slavery must
become a widely understood point of attack.
This core value of democracy means that novel and innovative
methods of perfecting our democracy warrant exploration, vetting, and
pursuit. Nationwide felony re-enfranchisement is an obvious choice for
cementing the Amendment 4 victory and expanding democracy in an
under-privileged population. This issue successfully passed in Florida.
The Electoral College and the U.S. Senate operate in bizarrely irrational
and antidemocratic ways, and pro-democracy efforts should challenge
these pro-slavery methods of placating the South. Law must recondition
the political system in accordance with contemporary realities; it should
cease indulging the slave-holder’s needs of yesteryear.
With respect to the Supreme Court, the law governing its comp–
osition is hopelessly tainted by the U.S. Senate and the Electoral
College, which both operate to determine the Court’s membership.
History clearly shows, however, that nine justices no longer suffices for
a country of over 300 million, and no constitutional provision requires
that membership perpetually stagnate at nine. The number of Supreme
Court justices has varied over time, and it is past time to again vary
the number of justices to reflect the nation they represent. Nine cannot
parade as a magic number any longer.
With respect to the U.S. Senate, it holds key veto power over the
composition of the Supreme Court and over legislation. Yet it operates
in defiance of the one-citizen-one-vote principle. If we take seriously the
blood spilt for greater voting rights, then the Senate must change. This
Article articulates an argument for legislation to expand the comp–
osition of the Senate by adding Senators to states with large populations
based upon the core value of democracy. Alternatively, the Senate could
expand through the admission of new states.
Our conclusion suggests that if a wide-ranging and ceaseless attack
is launched against the now manifest anti-democratic forces dominating
our government, then democratic pressure for racial reform will succeed.
This conclusion garners support from the demographic and economic
realities that surely will challenge the continuation of our racial
hierarchy. So long as the radical right fails to reimpose the oligarchy
that marred our nation’s birth, then racial progress should inexorably
follow the manifest contemporary economic and demographic realities
of our nation. That racial hierarchy, in fact, forms the source of the
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political power of the radical right. That summarizes the intimate
relationship between democracy and deracialization.
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